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INTRODUCTION

The over 900,000 K-12 students who are enrolled in
Minnesota’s 2214 public schools in 347 school districts are taught
by 70,000 teachers, a very small portion of whom are discharged
from their positions each year because of their professional
1
performance or personal behavior. Among that small number of
teachers, districts have little difficulty terminating teachers who are
still within their three-year probationary periods for they, like any
at-will employee, can typically be discharged for any reason or no
2
reason at all. However, school districts face a far more daunting
challenge when they attempt to terminate teachers who are past
their probationary periods because non-probationary teachers
3
enjoy significant job protections under Minnesota law.
Critics of public education in general, and the teachers’
statutory protections in particular, complain that it has become
virtually impossible to fire bad public school teachers in
4
Minnesota. However, others who disagree with those critics argue
that teachers sometimes need to be protected from unfair, even
vindictive, administrators and school boards, and that when it is
genuinely necessary to remove a teacher from the classroom, there
5
are ways to do so quietly and respectfully.
1. Debra O'Connor & Theresa Monsour, Rewarding The Best Teachers,
Replacing Bad Apples Not So Easy Training, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 1, 1997, at
A1. “While no one tracks teacher firings specifically, educators estimate there are
from 50 to 100 each year in Minnesota.” Id.
2. See infra Part III (discussing probationary teachers).
3. See MINN. STAT. § 122A.40 (2002) (originally enacted as MINN. STAT. §
125.12 (1941)); MINN. STAT. § 122A.41 (2002) (originally enacted as MINN. STAT. §
125.17 (1953)). Contracts of tenured teachers that do not expressly incorporate
provisions of tenure law are deemed to impliedly incorporate such provisions
including all amendments to law as they are made. Minn. Ass'n of Pub. Sch. v.
Hanson, 287 Minn. 415, 423, 178 N.W.2d 846, 852 (1970).
4. O'Connor & Monsour, supra note 1, at A1 (“Minnesota's laws, traditions
and bureaucracy make it difficult both to fire inept teachers and to reward
exceptionally good ones.”).
5. Id. Judy Schaubach, President of the then Minnesota Education
Association teacher organization, stated, “There's a huge misconception that the
union is about protecting bad teachers. We do routinely counsel people out of
the profession if they can't make those changes. It's a reflection on all of us.” Id.
However, the union has endorsed taking an active role in keeping quality
teachers—supporting mentorship programs for new teachers, for example—and
helping others, even if it means helping them out the door. Id. On the other
hand, James Knutson, of Knutson, Flynn and Deans (a Mendota Heights law firm
specializing in school law and representing many school districts in the state)
stated, “It is not impossible (to fire a teacher), ([b]ut) a difficulty is who is going
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This debate is among the most heated in public education.
Unfortunately, perceptions often drive reality. Stories abound of
teachers who have unfairly been driven from the profession,
protesting little because of the perception that it is futile to fight
the district. At the same time, stories circulate of school districts—
similarly overwhelmed by a sense of helplessness—that continue to
tolerate poor, even harmful, teachers, or that manage to foist them
6
on other unsuspecting districts. The public is also affected by
conflicting perceptions that even good teachers are at risk or that
bad teachers successfully hide behind tenure. These perceptions
can play a powerful role in determining the extent to which voters
are willing to support funding requests for public education.
It is important to understand the realities that surround the
discharge of a teacher, for embarking upon this path promises to
be painful for everyone involved.
Teachers who challenge
allegations that they are personally or professionally unworthy of
continuing to teach in their districts—or perhaps to continue to
teach at all—understandably experience extraordinary trauma and
anxiety. By the same token, districts that ultimately fail to prove
the case for discharge can face significant financial liability and
may even be forced to reinstate teachers who have been found to
be deficient. Finally, these efforts often divide schools and
communities because teachers, students, and parents are called to
testify for and against a teacher.
This article seeks to shed some light on this challenging
subject by examining Minnesota law concerning teacher
discharges, as Minnesota’s courts and arbitrators have interpreted
it. It is hoped that this guide will assist everyone who must deal
with the difficult issues that surround the proposed discharge of a
teacher for cause.

to come forward . . . . School districts can’t fish out all of the problems teachers
are having because of the limited number of administrators we have to conduct
observations and evaluations.” Id.
6. See id. Only since 1989 have school districts been required to report
terminations to the State Board of Teaching. Knutson said years ago that teachers
could be fired in one district and go to another to teach: “Years ago, I terminated
the same chap in four or five school districts. He went from one district to
another. We were like friends.” Id.
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II. HISTORY
Minnesota law concerning teacher discharges can be traced in
large part to nationwide debates that took place throughout the
1920s during a period of very high teacher turnover in many school
7
districts. Investigation revealed that much of this turnover was the
result of boards firing teachers for non-job-related reasons such as:
local politics, a teacher’s residing outside the district, favoritism to
friends and relatives, undercutting opposition to board policies, or
8
seeking to hire lesser-paid, new teachers.
Two competing philosophies arose in response to these
9
10
findings. One philosophy supported creating tenure for teachers.
Tenure would mean that teachers who successfully completed a
probationary period of one to five years would thereafter retain
their positions unless discharged for cause, and then only after
being given various due process protections including notice and
11
an opportunity to be heard. In contrast, a competing school of
thought urged adopting a continuing contract philosophy, whereby
a teacher’s contract would be automatically renewed each year
unless the school district terminated it by a certain deadline set by
12
statute. The continuing contract approach would obviously give a
school district more discretion than would a tenure system.
In 1927, the Minnesota Legislature took its first foray into this
arena by passing a tenure law for teachers in Duluth, Minneapolis,
and St. Paul—cities referred to in the statute as “cities of the first
13
class.”
Ten years later, the legislature passed a continuing
14
contract law, the Lager Bill, for all other teachers in the state. The
7. Harley M. Ogata, History of Continuing Contract and Tenure Law in
Minnesota, in MINNESOTA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION: FOURTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON SCHOOL LAW & LIABILITY § 1 (1995) [hereinafter History];
Telephone Interview with Harley M. Ogata, General Counsel, Education
Minnesota (April 14, 2004) [hereinafter Ogata Interview].
8. History, supra note 7, at 1; Ogata Interview, supra note 7.
9. See History, supra note 7, at 2.
10. Id.
11. Id.; Ogata Interview, supra note 7.
12. History, supra note 7, at 2; Ogata Interview, supra note 7, at 2.
13. 1 MINN. STAT. §§ 2935-1 to -14 (Mason 1927) (referring to the section laws
named “Teachers - Employment in First Class Cities”); History, supra note 7.
14. 3 MINN. STAT. § 2903 (Mason Supp. 1940) (this statute codified the Lager
Bill); see History, supra note 7, at 3.
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curious consequence of these two statutes was that teachers in
Minnesota’s three largest cities could be fired only for cause and
15
only after being accorded basic due process protections.
In
contrast, all other districts in the state could discharge their
teachers after each school year simply by giving notice by the
16
statutory deadline. It wasn’t until forty years later, in 1967, that
the legislature formally added the same due process protections to
the continuing contract law that the tenure law had included from
17
the beginning.
Thus, the Minnesota law that governs the discharge of non18
probationary teachers is in fact a compilation of two statutes.
19
Minnesota Statutes section 122A.41, also known as the Teacher
Tenure Act, governs the discharge of tenured teachers in the “first
class” cities of Duluth, Minneapolis, and St. Paul. Minnesota
20
Statutes section 122A.40, also known as the Continuing Contract
Act, governs the discharge of “continuing contract” teachers in all
other cities. However, as the following discussion will demonstrate,
as a practical matter, both statutes’ substantive and procedural
protections are in many ways the same in their terms and in how
21
they have been applied by the courts and in arbitration.
III. STATUTES’ COVERAGE
Given the significant protections that Minnesota education law
provides to teachers, it is important to understand who is and who
is not covered by its provisions.

15. See 3 MINN. STAT. § 2903 (Mason Supp. 1940); 1 MINN. STAT. §§ 2935-1 to 14 (Mason 1927); History, supra note 7, at 3.
16. 3 MINN. STAT. § 2903 (Mason Supp. 1940); see also History, supra note 7, at
3.
17. See Ogata Interview, supra note 7, at 3; MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 6(e)
(1967) (formerly codified as 3 MINN. STAT. § 2903 (Mason Supp. 1940), later
codified as MINN. STAT. § 130.18 (1941), now codified at MINN. STAT. § 125.12
(1961)).
18. See MINN. STAT. §§ 125.12, 125.17 (1967).
19. Id. § 122A.41 (2002).
20. Id. § 122A.40 .
21. See infra Part III; Jurkovich v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 708, Tower-Soudan,
478 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). “Tenure rights” under the Teacher
Tenure Act (MINN. STAT. § 122A.41 (2002)) are equivalent to “continuing contract
rights” under statute providing procedural protections for teachers (MINN. STAT. §
122A.40 (2002)), and the two terms are used interchangeably. Jurkovich, 478
N.W.2d. at 233 n.1 (citing Westguard v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 745, 400 N.W.2d 341,
344 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), pet. for review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 1987)).
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The Teacher Tenure Act, which covers teachers in Duluth,
Minneapolis, and St. Paul—collectively referred to as “cities of the
first class”—broadly defines a teacher as
[e]very person regularly employed, as a principal, or to
give instruction in a classroom, or to superintend or
supervise classroom instruction, or as placement teacher
and visiting teacher. Persons regularly employed as
counselors and school librarians shall be covered by
sections as teachers if licensed as teachers or as school
22
librarians.
Likewise, the Continuing Contract Act, which applies to
teachers in cities other than the first class, defines a teacher as “[a]
principal, supervisor, and classroom teacher and any other
professional employee required to hold a license from the state
23
department.”
Probationary teachers receive virtually no protection under
these provisions. The vast majority of cases that raise coverage
issues have involved teachers denied statutory protection on the
grounds that they were still in their three-year probationary
24
periods. Interestingly, neither the Teacher Tenure Act nor the
Continuing Contract Act sets a minimum number of hours a
teacher must work to receive credit for one year toward the three
years of probation. Thus, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has
found that a teacher who worked only seventy-nine hours during a
25
school year nevertheless had served one year of probation.
A
Minnesota Attorney General’s Opinion also agrees that
[a] contract between the school board and a teacher who
is serving his probationary period is an “annual contract . .
. Therefore, it is our opinion that an annual contract
satisfied one year of the required probationary period . . .
regardless of the length of actual teaching services
26
rendered during such period.

22.
23.
24.

MINN. STAT. § 122A.41, subd. 1(a) (2002).
Id. § 122A.40, subd. 1.
See Kevin J. Rupp, Probationary Teachers, in MINNESOTA CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION: THE EIGHTH ANNUAL SCHOOL LAW CONFERENCE § 6 (1999) for a more
detailed examination of teacher probation in Minnesota.
25. Flaherty v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2144, Chisago Lakes Sch., 577 N.W.2d
229, 235-36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
26. 5 Minn. Op. Att’y Gen. 90 (1972). This opinion does not extend to a
substitute teacher who is hired to replace an absent regular teacher or a regular
teacher on a leave of absence. See id.
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More recently, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that a
school district’s failure to comply with the statutory requirement
that districts evaluate their probationary teachers at least three
times a year did not invalidate St. Louis Park’s discharge of a
27
probationary teacher for budgetary reasons. The court observed
that because the provision that mandated these evaluations did not
identify any consequences for failure to comply, this could be
construed as a directory statute, and failure to comply with
directory statutes does not necessarily invalidate actions taken with
28
respect to them.
As the district had otherwise substantially
complied with the statute by giving the teacher timely notice that
her contract would not be renewed at end of the school year
(despite never having evaluated the teacher once in her three years
of teaching), the court held she had no right to a hearing to
29
challenge the district’s discretionary right to discharge her.
A case not involving issues of probation, which explored the
coverage of both the Teacher Tenure Act and the Continuing
Contract Act, established that only persons who specifically fall
within the express definitions of “teacher” qualify for these
30
The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that the
protections.
definition of “teacher” under the Teacher Tenure Act is exclusive
and the courts will not seek guidance from other education statutes
31
that define that term. Given this unwillingness to look outside the
statutes for help in applying the not always clear meaning of
“teacher,” the courts have thus been obliged to tackle the task
directly.
In Board of Education v. Sand, the Minnesota Supreme Court
declined to extend the statutory protections to a school
superintendent’s administrative assistant whose duties involved
32
research and statistical work incidental to school administration.
Since the position involved little or no superintending or
supervising of classroom instruction and no classroom teaching,
the assistant was not a “teacher” within the statutes’ definitions,
regardless of how the term was defined in other statutes relating to

27. Savre v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283, St. Louis Park, 642 N.W.2d 467, 471-72
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
28. Id. at 472.
29. Id. at 472-73.
30. Bd. of Educ. v. Sand, 227 Minn. 202, 34 N.W.2d 689 (1948).
31. Id. at 210, 34 N.W.2d at 694.
32. Id. at 212, 34 N.W.2d at 695.
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33

school matters. The thrust of this case has been clear: the closer
a person is to the classroom the more likely he or she will qualify as
a “teacher” and thus fall within the statutory protections.
IV. THE PROCESS OF DISCHARGE
A teacher who protests his or her discharge (or demotion, as
34
well, if in a “city of the first class”) has two possible bases for
challenge: (1) the process the district followed in undertaking the
discharge, or (2) the evidence upon which the district relied to
support the discharge. This section describes the process that a
35
district must strictly follow to comply with the statutory
36
requirements.
A. Starting the Process
Both the Teacher Tenure Act and Continuing Contract Act
prescribe the process a district must follow in proposing a teacher
for discharge. Although the process for both is similar, one very
significant difference is the Continuing Contract Act’s requirement
that school districts within its coverage must meet an April 1
deadline in order to propose the discharge of a continuing
37
contract teacher for professional incompetence. A district that
fails to give a teacher notice of his or her deficient performance, an
opportunity to remedy that performance, and the entire hearing
process (notice, hearing, and decision) by the April 1 deadline
must wait another year to initiate this process.
The process of discharge is triggered when charges against an
individual teacher are presented to a school board, and a majority
38
of the board members vote to propose termination. Although a
district administrator typically presents these charges, the Teacher

33. Id. at 209, 34 N.W.2d at 694.
34. MINN. STAT. § 122A.41, subd. 6 (Supp. 2003).
35. Both the Minnesota Supreme Court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals
have stated that a school district must strictly comply with the statute’s
requirements. See, e.g., Shell v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 811, Wabasha, 301 Minn. 442,
444, 223 N.W.2d 774, 775 (1974); In re Peterson, 472 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991).
36. At the outset, however, it is important to note that this process applies
only to district personnel who are specifically covered by the statute. 5 Minn. Op.
Atty. Gen. No. 89 (1972).
37. MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 7(a) (2002).
38. Id.
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Tenure Act specifically acknowledges the right of a person outside
of the district to bring charges to the board’s attention, which the
39
board may choose to pursue or disregard. Written notice must be
given to a teacher proposed for discharge for cause. Such a written
notice must set forth in reasonable detail the grounds for the
action and specifically advise the teacher of his or her right to elect
a full hearing on the matter before either the board or an
40
arbitrator.
The board’s notice to the teacher must also indicate the
deadline for requesting this hearing. The deadline is typically ten
to fourteen days from the date of the notice, although timeframes
41
can vary depending upon the basis for the discharge. A teacher
who fails to request a hearing within the mandatory time limits is
42
deemed to have acquiesced to the board’s proposed action, and a
teacher who requests a hearing but does not specifically direct that
it should be before an arbitrator is considered to have requested a
43
school board hearing. A district that receives a teacher’s timely
request for a hearing must schedule one and provide the teacher
with notice of its time and location, making sure to give the teacher
a reasonable time to prepare.
Throughout this process it is essential that a district remain
mindful of the teacher’s privacy rights under the Minnesota
44
Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA).
The Minnesota
Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Navarre v. South Washington
45
County Schools is particularly instructive on the ways in which
things can go horribly wrong when district officials reveal private
39. Id.
40. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 122A.41, subd. 7 (2002).
41. Minnesota Statutes section 122A.40 has specific calendar deadlines for
giving notice to a teacher who is proposed for termination on grounds set forth in
subdivision 9. A teacher proposed for termination on this basis must be so
notified by April 1 and has fourteen days to request a hearing, which must take
place in time to ensure final decision on the matter so that the termination is
effective at the close of that school year. In contrast, a district can propose a
teacher’s discharge pursuant to the more serious immediate termination
provisions of subdivision 13 at any time. However, a teacher proposed for
immediate discharge under subdivision 13 of the Teacher Tenure Act is given only
ten days within which to request a hearing on that matter. Minnesota Statutes
section 122A.41, subdivision 7 provides a ten-day period for a teacher in a city of
the first class to request a hearing.
42. MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 7(a) (2002).
43. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 15(a).
44. MINN. STAT. §§ 13.01-.99 (2002 & Supp. 2003).
45. 652 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. 2002).
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personnel data before there has been a final disposition
concerning a teacher’s discipline. In Navarre, the district broadly
released private data concerning a teacher’s classroom
management and instruction, even sharing that information with
46
the St. Paul Pioneer Press.
The teacher won a jury verdict of
$200,000 for loss of reputation, $250,000 for emotional distress,
47
and $70,000 for loss of income or earning capacity. When the
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case, the
48
teacher appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
In a decision that largely favored the teacher, the Minnesota
Supreme Court discussed the MGDPA at length and found that the
district had violated the MGDPA’s clear terms when it released
information concerning the complaints against the teacher while
49
The court emphasized that
her discipline was still pending.
before final disposition, districts can disclose only the existence and
status of complaints against the employee; they cannot provide
more detailed information concerning the nature and types of
50
those complaints. Because the district had indeed violated the
statute on several different occasions, the court upheld its liability
51
for emotional distress and loss of reputation damages. Although
the court remanded the case for a new trial, it did so because the
52
district court had committed several evidentiary errors.
The
underlying message remains clear and sobering: districts must
maintain strict confidentiality while progressing through the
discipline process.
B. Arbitration
Before 1991, a teacher who exercised his or her right to a
hearing was given one before the very school board that had issued
the notice of proposed termination. For many years teachers and
their representatives protested that this method of review—one in
which the board was arguably prosecutor, judge, and jury—was
fundamentally unfair. Protests continued even after Minnesota

46. Id. at 17.
47. Id. at 20-21.
48. Navarre, 633 N.W.2d 40, 48 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 652 N.W.2d 9
(Minn. 2002).
49. Navarre, 652 N.W.2d at 21.
50. Id. at 22-23.
51. Id. at 30.
52. Id. at 32.
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courts began directing school boards to hire independent
examiners to conduct the proceedings. Ultimately, in 1991, the
legislature amended Minnesota Statutes section 122A.40 and
Minnesota Statutes section 122A.41 to grant Minnesota teachers
the right to choose between a hearing before the board or before
53
an arbitrator.
Since that time, virtually all teacher termination
hearings have been held before an arbitrator.
There are several reasons why teachers prefer arbitration to a
board hearing and why the switch to arbitration has had a
significant impact on teacher discharges.
First, arbitration
addresses the concern that prompted its adoption in the first place:
the perception that the board hearing system was unfair to
teachers, even when presided over by hearing examiners.
Arbitration gives teachers the right to participate in selecting the
arbitrator, a person who is a recognized professional neutral and
54
whose fee is shared equally by the parties.
In addition, before the 1991 amendments, the “substantial
evidence” standard of proof was adopted in board hearings.
Similarly, in hearings before a school board the Continuing
55
Contract Act applies “substantial and competent evidence” and
56
“competent evidence” standards while the Teacher Tenure Act
57
applies a “best interest of the school” standard. These standards
are typically viewed as less burdensome than the “preponderance”
standard arbitrators must apply under the Continuing Contract
58
59
Act and Teacher Tenure Act.
Perhaps even more important is the quite different role
arbitration plays as contrasted with a court’s role. When a board of
education’s decision to discharge a teacher is appealed to the
courts, discharge is already a fait accompli and the court sits as an
appellate body to decide the appeal. The question before the court
is whether the board’s action was supported by “substantial
evidence” in the record. Within this framework, the courts have
been guided by the principle that the board of education is acting
in an administrative role when deciding to hire or fire a teacher:

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

MINN. STAT. §§ 122A.40, subd. 15, 122A.41, subd. 7 (2002).
Id. § 122A.40, subd. 15(b).
Id. § 122A.40, subd. 14.
Id. § 122A.40, subd. 16.
Id. § 122A.41, subd. 10.
Id. § 122A.40, subd. 15(c).
Id. § 122A.41, subd. 13(c).
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“On appeal to this court, a school board’s decision to terminate a
teacher will be set aside only if the decision is ‘fraudulent, arbitrary,
unreasonable, not supported by substantial evidence on the record,
not within the school board’s jurisdiction, or is based on an
60
erroneous theory of law.’”
The predictable result of this perspective is that the courts
have overturned very few teacher discharges. In contrast,
arbitration is a de novo rather than an appellate process;
arbitrators do not review discharge as a fait accompli as do the
courts, but instead conduct a de novo inquiry to determine
whether a district has supported its proposed discharge of the
teacher by a preponderance of the evidence in the record.
Another significant aspect of both Acts’ characterization of the
discharge as a “proposed discharge” is that under the Continuing
Contract Act, a suspended teacher continues to be paid throughout
61
the process, and although the Teacher Tenure Act does not
contain the same requirement, if the teacher wins, the district must
62
fully reimburse his or her back wages.
There is evidence that obtaining the right to go to arbitration
has significantly affected the outcome of many teacher discharge
cases. True, it is difficult to track the actual results of all teacher
terminations, for most are not appealed and the results of those
that do go to a hearing are not necessarily widely reported.
Nevertheless, it is revealing that attorneys at Education
Minnesota—an organization that represents virtually every K-12
public school teacher in the state—always elect arbitration rather
63
than a board hearing when a teacher is proposed for discharge.
Moreover, although there is no concrete statistical data, these
same advocates have expressed the sense that there have been
more settlements since the Minnesota Legislature amended the
Teacher Tenure and Continuing Contract Acts. It is possible that
the threat of arbitration now encourages at least some school
districts to modify what before would have been all-or-nothing
64
positions that gave teachers no choice but to resign or to litigate.
60. Ostlund v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 47, Sauk Rapids, 354 N.W.2d 492, 496
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
61. MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 13(a) (Supp. 2003).
62. Id. § 122A.41, subd. 12 (2002).
63. Ogata Interview, supra note 7.
64. William Garber, The Effects of Arbitration on Teacher Termination, in
MINNESOTA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION: THE FIFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
SCHOOL LAW & LIABILITY § 10 at 16 (1996).
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For example, because suspensions are not subject to arbitration
under statute, some districts might now more often suspend a
teacher rather than proceed directly to discharge. However, it is
noteworthy that suspensions are nevertheless subject to arbitration
under collective bargaining agreements and also often result in
reports to the Board of Teaching.
Another reason the move to arbitration has been significant
can be found in the courts’ diminishing role with respect to
developing and refining the law concerning teacher discharges.
65
Arbitration decisions are, with rare exception, “final and binding.”
This means that with most teacher discharges now decided in
arbitration, the courts are no longer being called upon to interpret
and apply the statutes’ provisions to the same extent as they did for
so many years. Thus, since 1991, there have been very few judicial
pronouncements regarding the two statutes. Certainly there have
been no landmark decisions comparable to the guidance the courts
66
provided in the cases of Kroll v. Independent School District No. 593
67
in 1981 and Downie v. Independent School District No. 141 in 1985,
both of which are discussed below.
C. City of Brooklyn Center v. Law Enforcement Labor Services
To the extent the courts were historically reluctant to overturn
what they viewed as school board discretion to discharge a teacher
for cause, they have been even less eager to overturn an arbitration
award on the subject. Minnesota has long maintained a strong
policy that favors arbitration as a means of resolving labor
68
disputes. Moreover, Minnesota’s Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA)
makes clear that an arbitrator’s decision can be overturned only on
69
exceptional grounds.
The UAA specifically identifies only five
narrow reasons that will permit vacating an arbitrator’s award:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other
undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed
65. MINN. STAT. §§ 122A.40, subd. 15(e), 122A.41, subd. 13(e) (2002).
66. 304 N.W.2d 338 (Minn. 1981).
67. 367 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
68. Jerviss v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 294, 273 N.W.2d 638, 645-46 (Minn. 1978);
see also Cianflone v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 112, Chaska, 2002 WL 1364247, at *2
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (articulating the deferential standard an arbitrator’s
decision related to a labor dispute decision is given by the reviewing court).
69. MINN. STAT. § 572.19 (2002).
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as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or
misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear
evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so
conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of
section 572.12, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a
party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was
not adversely determined in proceedings under section
572.09 and the party did not participate in the arbitration
70
hearing without raising the objection . . . .
The UAA also specifically rejects an arbitrator’s error of fact or
71
Thus, even “incorrect”
law as a reason to vacate the award.
72
arbitration awards are understood to be final and binding. Very
few are appealed; virtually none are vacated. This is yet another
way by which the 1991 amendments limited the courts’ involvement
in teacher discharge decisions.
It was against this backdrop that the Minnesota Court of
Appeals issued its 2001 decision in the closely watched case of City
73
of Brooklyn Center v. Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc., a decision
that the Minnesota Supreme Court later declined to review.
Despite the courts’ long-standing reluctance to review arbitration
decisions, City of Brooklyn Center is noteworthy because it may have
altered this presumption, at least in the public sector and perhaps
74
in public education.
In City of Brooklyn Center, the city had discharged a police
officer for engaging in a pattern of misconduct against young
75
women over a ten-year period. The matter went to arbitration
and the arbitrator found that the police officer had in fact engaged
76
in the alleged misconduct.
In unusually strong language, the
arbitrator opined that the officer’s conduct was “predatory and

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. City of Brooklyn Ctr. v. Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc., 635 N.W.2d
236 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), review denied (No. C5-01-414) (Dec. 11, 2001).
74. See id.
75. Id. at 238-40.
76. Id. at 240.
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intolerable” and “may have” violated Minnesota criminal law. The
arbitrator noted that the city had both the legal and moral
obligation to keep “out of control” police officers like the grievant
78
from harassing the public.
Perhaps most significantly, the
arbitrator found that if reinstated, the officer would be an
79
ineffective officer and an unbelievable witness.
Nevertheless, the arbitrator overturned the officer’s
80
discharge. He did so on the grounds that much of the alleged
conduct was time-barred for disciplinary purposes and that the
remaining conduct, while serious, did not warrant outright
81
dismissal. After expressing the “hope” that the officer would not
82
re-offend because he was “passing out of the dating scene,” the
83
arbitrator reinstated the officer without back pay.
The city moved to vacate this decision, arguing that it was
against public policy and that the arbitrator had exceeded his
84
powers.
After the district court denied that motion, the city
85
appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals. In deciding this
case, the court reiterated that it favors arbitration and ordinarily
86
upholds such awards. Nevertheless, the court also recognized that
public policy may at times require setting aside an arbitration
87
award and found this to be one of those cases.
The court appears to have reached this determination
cautiously by repeatedly emphasizing that this holding turned on
the exceptional facts in this case and should be narrowly
88
construed. Nevertheless, City of Brooklyn Center now stands for the
proposition that courts may overturn arbitrators’ awards when (1)
the labor agreement contains terms that violate public policy, or
(2) the arbitration award explicitly conflicts with other laws and

77. Brooklyn Ctr. v. Law Enforcement Labor Servs., BMS Case No. 00-PA-696,
46 (2000) (S. Bard, Arb.).
78. Id. at 43.
79. Id. at 50.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. City of Brooklyn Ctr. v. Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc., 635 N.W.2d
236, 240 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), review denied (No. C5-01-414) (Dec. 11, 2001).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 241.
87. Id. at 244.
88. Id.
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89

legal precedent.
It is not entirely clear what this decision means for future
cases. In a discussion undoubtedly designed to deflect criticism
that it was second guessing the arbitrator on the merits, the court
explained that the relevant consideration was not whether the
officer’s conduct violated some public policy, but rather whether
the arbitrator’s decision to reinstate him did so. To be more
precise, the court framed the relevant question to be: Did the
arbitrator’s interpretation of the agreement violate or interfere
with public policies that require affirmative steps to prevent sexual
90
harassment?
After reviewing the public policy against sexual
harassment, the court concluded that given the “extreme facts” of
this “extreme and unique” case the arbitrator’s award did violate
91
public policy and must be vacated.
In reaching this decision, the court could not have been
oblivious to the intense interest this matter had generated both
among members of the general public because of considerable
92
media attention, and more specifically within the labor relations
community. Thus, it is not surprising that City of Brooklyn Center
continues to provoke controversy. One enduring concern is that
the decision may open the “floodgates” to other appeals of
93
arbitration awards. The court sought to assuage this concern by
reiterating the narrow bases upon which it will vacate arbitration
awards and by emphasizing the exceptional nature of the facts in

89. See id.
90. Id. at 242.
91. Id. at 244.
92. This is certainly not the first time that the arbitration process has come to
the public’s attention and provoked media examination and criticism. In 1996,
the St. Paul Pioneer Press’ series entitled “Firing Public Employees” bemoaned the
“messy, everyday reality of labor arbitration” and “the consistently difficult and
unpredictable process through which government managers must attempt to
discipline or discharge troublesome employees.” D.J. Tice, Firing Public Employees,
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 4, 1996, at 10A (noting that most workers who have
an option chose to appeal their discharges through arbitration). The article
characterizes as “troubling” the fact that protections developed largely in the
private sector now comprise “a central influence on the standards to which public
servants are held.”). See id. Concerns were raised that arbitrators are “in effect
empowered to make important public policy through their unguided judgment
calls,” the policy about standards of conduct that the authors note applies to
employee groups who hold sensitive positions of public trust, including teachers.
Id.
93. City of Brooklyn Ctr., 635 N.W.2d at 244.
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94

this case. The court predicted that few, if any, other future cases
would present such “protracted outrageous behavior by a person
granted special powers and who is held out by his employer as a
person whom the public can trust, and who has unique
95
opportunities to engage in misconduct.”
Despite these efforts,
critics have difficulty viewing this case as anything other than
second guessing the arbitrator, which is in direct contradiction to
the UAA’s express rejection of error as a basis for vacating an
award.
Thus, questions remain. Does City of Brooklyn Center actually
reflect a narrow application of a long-standing rule to particularly
egregious facts, or does it instead misapply the law regarding
arbitration awards and public policy so that the “floodgates” are
now open for appealing unpopular arbitration awards? Despite the
court’s efforts to emphasize that its decision “does not threaten the
general rule regarding arbitration awards,” it is easy to see how it
may risk doing so for public employees generally and for public
96
educators in particular. Teachers, like police officers, are persons
“granted special powers” who are held out “as a person whom the
public can trust,” and who have “unique opportunities to engage in
97
misconduct.” It will not be surprising if a school district seeks to
appeal an arbitrator’s decision that reinstates a teacher whom the
district alleges poses an ongoing threat in the classroom. Time will
tell whether City of Brooklyn Center remains as limited as the court
intended.
V. REMEDIATION
A. Statutory Framework
As discussed above, two different statutes govern the discharge
98
Teachers employed in
of a non-probationary teacher.
Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth—the cities of the first class—are
tenured teachers and their proposed discharges are directed by
Minnesota Statutes section 122A.41 (Teacher Tenure Act).
Teachers in all other Minnesota school districts are continuing
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.
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contract teachers whose proposed discharges are governed by
Minnesota Statutes section 122A.40 (Continuing Contract Act).
The two statutes parallel each other in many respects, and
there is rarely reason for the courts and arbitrators to analyze cases
brought under them differently.
However, one important
distinction concerns a continuing contract teacher’s right in many
cases to be given notice and an opportunity to correct deficiencies
before being proposed for discharge. The Teacher Tenure Act
99
does not expressly provide tenured teachers with this right.
More specifically, the Continuing Contract Act identifies two
100
processes for discharging a continuing contract teacher for cause.
A district governed by this statute can elect one of two paths upon
which to proceed. One path—described in subdivision 9—requires
the district to first notify the teacher of his or her deficiencies and
101
give that teacher a reasonable opportunity to correct them.
In
essence, this subdivision specifically focuses on the remediability of
102
In contrast, subdivision 13 enumerates
the teacher’s conduct.
more serious conduct and permits a district to discharge a tenured
103
teacher immediately for such conduct.
The district is not
required to give the teacher notice or an opportunity to remedy his
104
or her deficient conduct. A district that chooses the latter course
105
assumes a heavier burden of proof if the action is challenged.
In contrast, the statutory provisions that govern the remaining
school districts—the three cities of the first class (Minneapolis, St.
Paul, and Duluth)—do not expressly reference giving a teacher the
106
opportunity to remedy deficiencies.
Nevertheless, most court
and arbitration decisions in which this issue arises suggest that
unless immediate discharge is warranted pursuant to the statutory
guidelines, teachers in those cities should also be given notice and
an opportunity to remedy their deficiencies before being proposed
for discharge. The decisions that extend this right to “tenured
teacher” cases, notwithstanding the Teacher Tenure Act’s silence
on the matter, are probably influenced by both the Continuing
Contract Act’s specific provisions as well as long-standing and
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See MINN. STAT. § 122A.41 (2002).
See id. § 122A.40 (2002 & Supp. 2003).
Id. § 122A.40, subd. 9.
See id.
Id. § 122A.40, subd. 13.
Id.
See id.
See id. § 122A.41.
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broadly applied general principles of progressive discipline.
B. Kroll’s Four-Factor Test
In 1981, the Minnesota Supreme Court provided the most
definitive statement to date concerning a district’s ability to
immediately discharge a teacher rather than first provide an
opportunity to remediate performance or behavior. In Kroll v.
Independent School District No. 593, the school board found an
elementary school teacher’s disciplinary methods to be “cruel,
excessive, and contrary to the standard of professional conduct
established for certified classroom teachers” and voted for her
107
immediate discharge.
The central issue the court faced in Kroll was how to decide
108
which termination procedure to follow.
In this case of first
impression, the court considered the difference between focusing
on the “remediability” of a teacher’s conduct versus focusing on its
“detrimental impact” on the school district.
Specifically, a
remediability analysis stresses giving a teacher notice of and a
reasonable time to correct deficient conduct, while a detrimental
impact analysis gives greater weight to the “severity of the conduct’s
109
impact upon the class and the teacher’s ability to teach . . . .”
In Kroll, the court rejected the detrimental impact analysis in
favor of the remediability approach, concluding that the latter
“best serves the purpose of the legislature in creating two
110
termination procedures.”
The court found that the legislature
had intended to balance a school board’s need to make
discretionary administrative decisions with a teacher’s need to be
protected from arbitrary dismissals, and concluded that the
111
remediability analysis achieved the best balance.
Therefore, the
final decision concerning a teacher’s discharge depends a great
112
deal upon whether the offensive conduct is remediable.
In then considering the standards by which to judge whether
conduct is remediable, the Minnesota Supreme Court favorably
cited a test announced in an Illinois Supreme Court case: “[T]he
test . . . ‘is whether damage has been done to the students, faculty
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Kroll v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 593, 304 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. 1981).
Id. at 345.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 344-45.
Id. at 346.
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or school, and whether the conduct resulting in that damage could
113
have been corrected had the teacher’s superiors warned her.’”
Kroll then built upon that test by identifying additional factors that
114
must be considered during any termination proceeding.
First, “[t]he prior record of a teacher . . . must always be
115
considered under either termination procedure.”
In this case,
Kroll had a twenty-three-year unblemished record before the single
116
The district’s refusal to
incident that led to her dismissal.
consider that demonstration of fitness over so many years was
found to negate any advantage inherent in the tenure system and
117
thus, the district did not meet that test.
Next, the finder of fact
must consider the severity of the conduct “in light of the teacher’s
118
record as a whole.”
This requires considering whether a
teacher’s misconduct has been ongoing or whether—as was the
question in Kroll—a single incident “is so outrageous that it cannot
be remedied in light of the danger the teacher’s presence in the
119
classroom would present.”
Third, did the conduct result in
120
actual harm or threatened harm?
Although districts need not
wait for harm—either physical or psychological harm—to come to
students before dismissing a teacher, absence of harm should be
121
considered in determining whether conduct is remediable.
Finally, the fourth factor is “whether the conduct . . . could have
122
been corrected had the teacher been warned by superiors.”
C. Applying the Four-Factor Test in Kroll
The facts upon which the district relied in Kroll did not meet
this four-factor test. Kroll was a third grade teacher who at the time
of the incident had served twenty-three years with an unblemished
123
record.
A recent evaluator had noted the atmosphere in her
classroom was “condusive [sic] to good learning,” and the evaluator
113. Id. at 345 (quoting Gilliland v. Bd. of Educ. of Pleasant View Consol. Sch.
Dist. No. 622, 365 N.E.2d 322, 326 (Ill. 1977)).
114. Id. at 345-46.
115. Id. at 345.
116. Id. at 340.
117. Id. at 345.
118. Id. at 346.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 345.
123. Id. at 340.
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observed that Kroll gave “special attention to a new student
experiencing adjustment problems. The teacher is concerned
124
about the health and safety of students.”
It is against this
backdrop that the critical event occurred.
On the day in question, Kroll was apparently having discipline
problems. After one student denied throwing an object on the
floor, she told him “to stand beside his desk and extend his arms to
125
The class then jeered when the
[his] side in ‘airplane’ fashion.”
126
student failed to keep his arms raised.
As Kroll returned to her
desk, she picked up several pins lying in the chalk tray, whereupon
127
Accounts of what
one of the children cried out, “She has pins!”
128
happened next differ sharply.
Although the student and two
other children testified that Kroll placed a pin approximately one
inch under each elbow to force the student to hold them straight,
Kroll testified that she simply pointed with the hand that did not
have the pins and that the student held his arms out for a very short
129
time.
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s first challenge was
to decide whether the evidence supported the school board’s
130
findings.
Then the court had to decide whether the board’s
decision to terminate Kroll immediately, rather than give her an
opportunity to correct her behavior, had been “arbitrary,
131
unreasonable, or contrary to law.”
The court’s review of the
record as a whole convinced it that there was no substantial
evidence that Kroll had, in fact, held pins under the student’s arms
132
to prevent him from lowering them. In accepting Kroll’s account
over the students’, the court acknowledged:
We do not take our decision regarding the competency
and probative value of the child testimony lightly. Often
student testimony may be the only source of evidence
contrary to the possibly self-serving explanation from the
teacher. However, under these unique facts, when the
discrepancies in the testimony are both numerous and

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 341.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 342.
Id.
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highly variable, reasonable minds cannot rely upon the
testimony to arrive at a precise conclusion regarding the
purpose for which appellant was holding pins in her
133
hand.
Here, the students’ testimony was so “fraught with
134
It was
inconsistencies” that it effectively had no probative value.
particularly noteworthy that the alleged victim had difficulty
recalling the incident, and not one student in the class, including
the victim, had expressed a fear of returning to the classroom or
135
had even reported this incident to their parents. Thus, the court
found that to the extent Kroll had done anything wrong, she
should have been given notice and an opportunity to correct any
136
behavior the district found objectionable.
There was no
indication that, given a proper warning, she could not have
adapted her disciplinary approach to fit the district’s unwritten
137
policy.
Accordingly, the court reversed the board’s action and
138
directed the district to reinstate Kroll with back pay.
D. Applying Kroll’s Four-Factor Test in Other Cases
An argument can be made that because arbitration proceeding
are de novo, and because the statutes do not mention the Kroll test,
arbitrators are not obliged to apply the above standards. Moreover,
Kroll was decided under the earlier “substantial evidence” test,
while arbitrators now apply the “preponderance” test. Nevertheless,
the reality is that arbitrators have decided, and continue to decide,
discharge cases under Kroll’s analysis where it applies. Thus, Kroll
and the subsequent cases that have applied and further refined the
Kroll standards remain highly relevant in arbitration.
Minnesota courts following Kroll had no difficulty upholding
the immediate discharges of teachers shown to have sexually or
139
physically abused students. For example, in In re Etienne, a district
began termination proceedings after it received a letter from a
former student twelve years after her graduation alleging she had

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 343.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 342-43.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 346.
Id.
460 N.W.2d 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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140

sexual relations with a teacher while in high school.
Although
the hearing examiner recommended that the teacher be issued a
one-year suspension—presumably because so many years had
passed—the board rejected that recommendation and terminated
141
the teacher effective immediately. The court of appeals affirmed
142
that decision.
Similarly, in 1996 the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a
teacher’s discharge for improper sexual contact with a student,
143
even though the teacher died during the pendency of the appeal.
Observing that the case nevertheless involved an “issue of public
concern that was capable of repetition,” the court refused to
144
disturb the findings of fact.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals’ widely cited decision in
145
Downie v. Independent School District No. 141 was unique in that it
upheld a junior high school guidance counselor’s immediate
discharge on charges other than sexual or physical abuse. Downie
was a four-year junior high school guidance counselor with good
evaluations and no prior discipline when the district immediately
discharged him on charges of:
1. [B]eing involved in a weight-loss bet with two ninthgrade female students, the terms of which included sexual
activities with Downie;
2. [T]elling two male teachers in the teachers’ lounge
about entering into the bet;
3. [S]ending a handwritten note to a ninth-grade female
student which stated: “Stay out of my fucking business;”
4. [R]epeatedly administering an oral survey to individuals
and groups of junior high school students regarding their
personal sexual activities;
5. [U]sing vulgar, crude, and inappropriate language and
stories when speaking to students;
6. [S]exually harassing staff and students by making
inappropriate remarks and staring at their bodies; and
7. [B]reaching the confidentiality of students whom he

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 110.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 110.
Falgren v. State Bd. of Teaching, 545 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1996).
Id. at 903.
367 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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146

counseled.
The court of appeals found that these were sufficient grounds
147
to support Downie’s immediate discharge. After first noting and
adopting the hearing examiner’s detailed explanation why the
allegations were true, the court highlighted one feature of the case
that it deemed particularly important:
Downie was a junior high school counselor who counseled
students on a one-to-one basis. His was in a very influential
and sensitive position. Because of his role as counselor,
students confided in Downie to a much greater extent
than they would in a teacher of English or math. The
potential for students to be greatly harmed or greatly
aided by their relationship with Downie was substantial.
His impact on the lives of impressionable young people of
junior high school age was great. Arguably, he should be
held to an even greater standard of care and sensitivity
148
than teachers in other disciplines.
It is noteworthy that the court found the counselor’s breach of
confidence to be even more serious than his sexual bantering with
the students:
We find particularly offensive Downie’s disclosure of an
incest victim’s confidences to teachers in a social setting
who had no compelling professional need for such
information. The school nurse’s testimony supports that
such a disclosure could have devastating psychological
consequences for the victim should she ever discover that
Downie made such a disclosure. Furthermore, the record
supports that such breaches of the confidential
relationship between counselee and counselor were not
uncommon for Downie. Testimony indicates that some
teachers even stopped referring students to Downie due
to their concerns regarding his professional competency
149
and ethics.
In summary, it is clear from Kroll and Downie that districts that
attempt to immediately discharge a teacher, instead of first giving
the teacher notice and an opportunity to improve, face demanding
standards of proof. Those standards are most easily met when
there is proof of sexual contact or physical abuse. However, Downie
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 915.
Id. at 918.
Id. at 917.
Id. at 917-18.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss1/9

24

Ver Ploeg: Terminating Public School Teachers for Cause Under Minnesota Law
VERPLOEG(LS &CB).DOC

2004]

10/3/2004 9:42:09 PM

TERMINATING PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS

327

demonstrates that other conduct, if sufficiently egregious, can also
meet that burden.
E. Remediation Details
Broad pronouncements that a teacher should be given an
opportunity to remedy deficient performance do not address
several concrete questions that surround this prerequisite to
discharge. Questions include: What qualifies as a remediation
plan, and how is one to be implemented? For example, sometimes
the parties disagree whether a teacher was given remedial
opportunities in the first place. This presents a different question
than determining whether a teacher has successfully corrected
identified deficiencies.
A recent arbitration involving the proposed discharge of a St.
Paul elementary teacher presented this issue squarely to the
150
arbitrator.
When the teacher protested her discharge, in part
because the district had not given her a formal Performance
Improvement Plan (PIP), the superintendent responded to that
151
argument with two assertions of her own.
First, the
superintendent testified that PIPs are designed to improve teaching
152
effectiveness in the classroom.
PIPs do not address matters of
mistreatment of students or tardiness or insubordination, and are
not necessary prerequisites to discharging a teacher for personal
153
misconduct. The superintendent testified that here the bases for
discharge—inappropriate student discipline, excessive tardiness
and insubordination—were all-or-nothing matters for which there
154
is no such thing as gradual improvement.
Second, the
superintendent pointed to the countless directives and discipline
issued to the teacher over many years and argued that, in any event,
155
those did constitute a performance improvement plan. They had
informed the teacher of the district’s expectations of her
performance and provided a measure by which to ultimately
156
conclude she would not or could not meet those expectations.

150. Barnes-Griswold v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, St. Paul, BMS Case No. 03TD-6 (2003) (Ver Ploeg, Arb.).
151. Id. at 21-22.
152. Id. at 21.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 22.
156. Id.
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The arbitrator accepted both arguments, concluding that the
school district had met its burden of proving proper discharge of
157
the teacher.
Another issue surrounding the question of remediation
concerns the number of times a teacher must be given an
opportunity to remedy his or her deficiencies. In 2002, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals provided some helpful guidance on
158
this question in Cianflone v. Independent School District No. 112. In
Cianflone, the Chaska School District had suspended an elementary
school music teacher in 1993 “for making unacceptable physical
contact with students and using inappropriate and demeaning
159
methods of discipline.”
An arbitrator upheld the ten-day
suspension and affirmed a board directive that prohibited the
teacher “from touching students, from allowing his anger to affect
his interaction with students, and from making any statements to
160
students that could be reasonably interpreted as threats.”
161
However, in
The next five years passed without incident.
162
early 1998, two incidents occurred.
In February, the teacher
“shouted ‘shut up already’ at two disruptive students and threw a
hand drum across the room for what he characterized as ‘dramatic
163
effect.’”
Two months later, as the teacher took a disruptive
student by the arm and escorted him to the principal’s office, the
classroom door swung shut and made contact with both student
164
and teacher.
Based upon these two incidents, the school board proposed to
165
terminate the teacher’s employment as of June 1998. After a fiveday hearing, the arbitrator found that the conduct was not
sufficiently severe to warrant termination under Minnesota Statutes
166
section 125.12, subdivision 8, the immediate discharge section,
167
but did uphold the termination under subdivision 6 on the
157. Id. at 24.
158. No. CX-01-2269, 2002 WL 1364247 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
159. Id. at *1.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. See MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 8 (1996) (now codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 122A.40, subd. 13 (2002)).
167. Cianflone, 2002 WL 1364247, at *1. The court of appeals upheld the
termination under Minnesota Statutes section 125.12, subdivision 6 (1996) (now
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grounds that the teacher had engaged in a persistent pattern of
168
inappropriate behavior.
In attempting to overturn that decision, the teacher argued
that the arbitrator had exceeded his power because he denied the
teacher his subdivision 6 right to an opportunity to correct any
169
deficiency.
However, the court rejected that argument, finding
that the board’s 1993 directive had given the teacher five years to
170
do so. The Court noted that if, as the teacher asserted, a district
“was required to wait a reasonable time after every additional
deficiency occurred, no teacher could ever be terminated for
171
improper conduct.”
Other interesting questions can arise when remediation plans
contain counseling requirements. Arbitrators who issue such
directives in education and other labor cases often fail to identify
which party must assume that expense.
However, in 2002
Arbitrator Olson reduced a proposed immediate discharge to a
one-semester suspension, while also directing a “remediation plan
that includes psychological evaluation and counseling by a
qualified professional of the District’s choosing and at the teacher’s
172
expense.”
Another difficult question is who decides whether
such counseling has been successful.
VI. BASES FOR DISCHARGE
A. Statutory Overview
Districts that attempt to discharge a teacher (or, in the case of
a city of the first class, discharge or demote) can do so only upon
evidence of deficient performance or personal behavior that fits
within categories identified within the pertinent statute. The
Teacher Tenure Act lists “grounds for discharge or demotion”
173
within a single provision that is sufficiently general to embrace
virtually any type of professional or personal conduct. Similarly,

codified at MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 9 (2002)). Id. at *1.
168. Id. at *1.
169. Id. at *3.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Educ. Minn. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 622, N. St. Paul-Maplewood-Oakdale,
BMS Case No. 02-TD-8, 13 (2002) (Olson, Arb.).
173. MINN. STAT. § 122A.41, subd. 6 (2002).
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the Continuing Contract Act lists categories broad enough to
embrace almost all conduct perceived as detrimental to the
174
educational process. The Continuing Contract Act is noteworthy
175
in that the statute is further divided into two different provisions.
Subdivision 9 of the Continuing Contract Act, which applies to
continuing contract teachers, identifies four broad categories of
deficiency: inefficiency, neglect of duty, unbecoming conduct, and
176
A district that attempts to
“other good and sufficient grounds.”
discharge a continuing contract teacher pursuant to this provision
cannot do so unless it has first given the teacher notice of his or her
deficiencies and a reasonable plan and time-frame within which to
177
remedy them.
As was discussed in the preceding section, a
district can discharge a teacher only upon showing that it made
178
Even then, the
these efforts and that these efforts have failed.
district can propose the teacher’s discharge only at the end of the
school year and only after meeting the Continuing Contract Act’s
April 1 deadline for completing the entire process of discharge:
giving notice and opportunity to remedy, notice of hearing and
179
hearing, and receipt of final decision.
In contrast, subdivision 13 identifies separate bases to support
180
the immediate discharge of a teacher.
Those grounds generally
parallel those in subdivision 9, but they address more serious forms
181
For example, the subdivision 9 reference to
of that conduct.
182
inefficiency becomes “gross” inefficiency under subdivision 13.
Similarly, neglect of duty provides the basis for a section 13
183
Other conduct that
immediate discharge only if it is “willful.”
warrants immediate discharge includes immoral conduct, serious
insubordination, a felony conviction, unbecoming conduct that
requires immediate removal from the classroom, failure to teach,
184
and a twelve-month disability.
174. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 9.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See supra Part V.
179. MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 16 (2002).
180. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 13 (emphasis added).
181. Compare MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 9 (2002), with MINN. STAT. §
122A.40, subd. 13 (2002).
182. Compare MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 9 (2002), with MINN. STAT. §
122A.40, subd. 13 (2002).
183. MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 13 (2002).
184. Id. § 122A.40, subd. 9.
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Regardless of whether the path a district takes to propose
discharge follows remediation efforts or immediate discharge,
challenges require arbitrator to review the record as a whole to
determine whether the district has (1) met its burden of proving
the conduct complained of actually occurred, and (2)
demonstrated that the proven conduct has been sufficiently
egregious to discharge the teacher either immediately after the
185
186
hearing or effective at the end of the school year.
Some conduct is so outrageous that if the fact of its occurrence
is not challenged, then no one would seriously question the
teacher’s removal from the classroom. However, those cases rarely
go to hearing. Rather, such cases are often resolved quietly in ways
that the teacher, represented by Education Minnesota, and the
district agree are in everyone’s best interests. Cases that do go to
hearing and thus become a matter of public record are typically the
problematic cases for which the statutory guidelines provide little
clear guidance.
The following discharge cases are grouped into those that
involve issues of performance and those that involve personal
behavior. Performance-based discharges and demotions typically
187
use the statutory terminology of failure to teach, inefficiency in
188
189
teaching or school management, or neglect of duty, and almost
always include allegations that the teacher was given notice and an
opportunity to improve performance but failed to do so. In
contrast, discharges or demotions based on a teacher’s personal
behavior are typically characterized by the statutory terms “immoral
190
character” or “conduct unbecoming a teacher” and have less
often involved remediation efforts. In addition, to the extent that
the preceding categories might fail to embrace the conduct
complained of, a district not of the first class can seek to discharge
a non-probationary teacher based upon the Act’s catch-all phrase:
“other good and sufficient grounds” that render the teacher unfit
191
to perform his or her duties.
The following discussion explores these two broad categories.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See id. §§ 122A.40, subd. 13; 122A.41, subd. 4.
Id. § 122A.40, subd. 9.
See id. §§ 122A.40, subd. 13(a)(3); 122A.41, subd. 6(a)(2).
See id. §§ 122A.40, subd. 9(a); 122A.41, subd. 6(a)(3).
See id. § 122A.40, subd. 9(b), subd. 13(a)(5) (2002).
See id. §§ 122A.40, subds. 9(c), 13(a)(1)-(2); 122A.41, subd. 6(a)(1).
Id. § 122A.40, subd. 9(d).
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In addition, it also examines cases that involve a teacher’s inability
to teach because of licensure issues or health and disability reasons.
B. Professional Performance
Despite the broad reach of the statutory categories, recorded
cases reveal a few recurring types of performance-related
allegations that have caused districts to propose a teacher’s
discharge. The following three cases illustrate several of the most
common performance-based themes.
1.

Performance in the Classroom

In 1981, the Minnesota Supreme Court examined issues of
teacher performance in Ganyo v. Independent School District No.
192
832. Ganyo involved a high school teacher with seventeen years in
the district, plus eight years previous teaching experience, who
received a notice of deficiency after her assistant principal and
assistant superintendent evaluated her and identified two incidents
that allegedly demonstrated ineffective communication with
193
The notice of deficiency identified eight
students’ parents.
concerns and specifically directed Ganyo as to how she was to
194
correct those behaviors. For example, with respect to her “lack of
clear directions to the students,” she was instructed that
[v]erbal directions should be given slowly and clearly.
Long and complex directions are to be avoided. Written
directions, whether on the blackboard or on paper should
be clear, neat, concise and grammatically correct. You
should make sure each direction has been understood
195
before proceeding with the lesson.
The seven other areas of deficiency, all of which were also
accompanied by specific directives, were: classroom control,
listening, record keeping, parent communications, instructional
criteria and student evaluations, discussion of personal matters,
196
and relations with staff and supervisors.
The assistant principal who issued the notice of deficiency on
January 2, 1979 told the teacher that she would be expected to

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

311 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. 1981).
See id. at 498.
Id. at 498-99.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 498-99.
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show improvement during a second round of formal observations
197
The assistant principal did observe Ganyo
on February 1, 1979.
198
twice in her classroom in early February.
On February 26, 1979,
the school board passed a resolution proposing her discharge
199
effective at the end of the school year. That resolution classified
the eight areas listed in the notice of deficiency as: “[i]nefficiency,
neglect of duty, persistent violation of school rules, regulations and
directives, and other good and sufficient grounds rendering you
200
unfit to perform your duties.”
Ganyo requested and was given a
201
hearing before the school board at the end of March 1979.
Immediately after that hearing, the board met for forty-five minutes
and passed a motion to terminate her at the end of the school year
based upon the recited deficiencies (except for the charge of
202
inadequate record keeping, which was stricken).
Ganyo appealed the board’s decision to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, which reviewed the evidence and concluded that
the record contained “little probative evidence to substantiate that
203
each of the alleged deficiencies existed or was not cured.”
The
court reached this conclusion despite its assurance that it does not
set aside board decisions to terminate unless they are “fraudulent,
arbitrary, unreasonable, not supported by substantial evidence on
the record, not within the school board’s jurisdiction or . . . based
204
The court’s explanation of why
on an erroneous theory of law.”
the evidence in this case was not worthy of the deference typically
given to board decisions serves as a helpful guide in designing and
implementing a fair process in other cases.
First, it is apparent that the court expected the district to
support its allegations of unsatisfactory teaching performance with
more than a single supervisor’s observations. In this case, only the
assistant principal observed Ganyo’s teaching before and after the
205
notice of deficiency.
Although the court stopped short of
requiring that districts use more than one evaluator, it not so subtly

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
1981).
205.

Id. at 498.
Id. at 499.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 499-500.
Id. at 500.
Id. See also Kroll v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 593, 304 N.W.2d 338, 342 (Minn.
Ganyo, 311 N.W.2d at 500.
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observed that “the severity of termination for a tenured teacher
206
suggests that such a course would be wise.” This is especially true
where, as it appeared here, the teacher was in fact making efforts
207
and had improved in several areas.
Furthermore, the court found that the record failed to
demonstrate “substantial evidence” of poor teaching performance
given the assistant principal’s acknowledgement that Ganyo had
improved with respect to two of the charges against her and the
fact that the district had dropped another charge before the
208
hearing.
It was noteworthy that the final record cited only two
alleged incidents concerning parental communication, neither of
209
which seemed particularly blameworthy.
As for Ganyo’s alleged
resistance to criticism and supervision from the administration, the
court found that
the English Department as a whole had a problem in
dealing with one administrator, and that Ganyo, as a longterm tenured teacher reacted in an understandably
defensive manner to a deficiency notice which she neither
understood nor felt was warranted. The record indicates
that Ganyo was making efforts to improve her teaching;
she had improved in several areas by her own testimony
210
and by that of students and her supervisor, Moran.
Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court ordered Ganyo reinstated
211
and compensated for her lost wages.
One year after Ganyo, the court reached a different conclusion
concerning a teacher’s performance in Whaley v. Anoka-Hennepin
212
Independent School District No. 11.
Before his discharge, Whaley
“had served for nineteen consecutive years as a teacher and a
principal in the . . . [d]istrict, the last three of these years as a
213
reading teacher [in the elementary school].”
In May 1980, the
district gave him a notice of deficiency, which supplemented a
214
similar notice he had been given two years earlier. The May 1980
notice alleged the following deficiencies: (1) poor rapport with

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 501.
Id.
Id. at 502.
325 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 1982).
Id. at 129.
Id.
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students; (2) insufficient communications with parents and fellow
staff members; (3) inappropriate use of class time; (4) failure to be
punctual or appear at appointments; (5) failure to follow the
school board’s adopted reading program; (6) irrational grading of
215
students; and (7) lack of student progress.
The following school year, administrators observed Whaley’s
classroom performance on six separate occasions between
September and January, and the administrators met with him to
216
apprise him of his teaching performance.
Despite these efforts,
that February the board—presumably having concluded that
Whaley could not or would not improve his performance—issued
217
him a notice of proposed termination. After a hearing before the
board, presided over by a hearing officer, Whaley appealed his
218
discharge and the district court reinstated him. The district court
found that there was no evidence that Whaley’s frequent use of
worksheets had adversely affected his students and there was no
219
evidence that his disciplinary methods were inappropriate.
The school district then appealed the case to the Minnesota
220
Supreme Court.
In undertaking this review the court reiterated
its limited role in reviewing board decisions:
When deciding whether to hire or to terminate a teacher,
a board of education is acting in an administrative
capacity. On appeal to this court, a school board’s
decision to terminate a teacher will be set aside only if the
decision is “fraudulent, arbitrary, unreasonable, not
supported by substantial evidence on the record, not
within the school board’s jurisdiction, or is based on an
221
erroneous theory of law.”
However, the court made it clear that although it accepted a
222
limited judicial role vis-à-vis a board’s fact finding processes, it did
223
not similarly defer to trial court determinations. In reversing the
215. Id.
216. Id. at 129-30.
217. Id. at 130.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 129-31.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 130 (citing Ganyo v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 832, 311 N.W.2d 497, 500
(Minn. 1981)).
222. Id. at 130-31 (citing Anderson v. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 144, 196 Minn.
256, 257-58, 264 N.W. 784, 784-85 (1936)). Cf. City of N. St. Paul v. Minn. Water
Res. Bd., 260 N.W.2d 584, 586-87 (Minn. 1977).
223. The court stated that it “owes no deference to the trial court’s
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district court’s findings in favor of Whaley, the court found
“substantial evidence in the record” of four major deficiencies that
224
justified his discharge.
First, the Minnesota Supreme Court shared the school
district’s concern that Whaley had used worksheets in the
classroom more often and more extensively than other instructors,
225
and that this had caused much student confusion and frustration.
An outside instruction consultant who had visited the classroom
confirmed the school principal’s testimony that Whaley used
worksheets so much that it produced a poor learning environment
226
and inhibited student progress.
Because this discharge was brought under statutory provisions
227
that first called for notice and an opportunity to correct behavior,
it can be assumed that Whaley had been told to alter his use of the
worksheets but had failed to do so. Whether this issue alone would
have warranted Whaley’s discharge is unclear.
The court’s
surprisingly strong assertion that Whaley had “used worksheets
improperly and to such excess that it justified the termination of
228
his contract . . . .”
suggests that this allegation in and of itself
could have supported discharge.
However, the court then
tempered this observation by noting that its holding in the district’s
favor relied not only on “the probative force of this evidence” (the
worksheet allegation), but also the “related evidence through the
229
record.” Thus, this tantalizing question remains unresolved.
Next, the court observed that the evidence that Whaley’s
students had failed to make appropriate progress was “the most
closely related to the statutory grounds for discharge and the most

determination.” Kroll v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 593, 304 N.W.2d 338, 342 (Minn.
1981). “Because this court conducts an independent review of the entire record
before the School Board without according deference to the same review
conducted by the court below, the question of whether the District Court utilized
the correct standard of review has no bearing on our disposition of this matter.”
Whaley, 325 N.W.2d at 130 (citing Urban Council on Mobility v. Minn. Dept. of
Natural Res., 289 N.W.2d 729, 732-33 (Minn. 1980); Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst,
256 N.W.2d 808, 824 (Minn. 1977)).
224. Whaley, 325 N.W.2d at 131.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 9 (2002). The Whaley court cited to the
formerly codified version at MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 6 (1980)). Whaley, 325
N.W.2d at 131.
228. Whaley, 325 N.W.2d at 131.
229. Id.
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230

clearly supported by substantial evidence in the record.”
Administrators had reached this conclusion based upon in-class
observations and student performance on district-wide skills, tests,
231
and worksheets.
They also considered evaluations of a reading
curriculum consultant and three other teachers who reviewed the
records or worked with the students and found that the students
232
had not made satisfactory progress.
In contrast, no teachers
testified on Whaley’s behalf, although a few students did testify that
233
they were satisfied with their progress.
Agreeing that students
had made unsatisfactory progress because of Whaley’s poor
teaching performance, the court found that “lack of student
progress is sufficient to trigger the grounds for discharge under
234
[the terms of the statute].”
With these findings, the court did not then discuss the
evidence concerning the remaining two of the four major
deficiencies it had cited: the teacher’s lack of rapport with students
235
and his lack of appropriate student discipline.
Apparently, the
two deficiencies that the court did comment upon, particularly the
evidence of lack of student progress, were so compelling that the
court found it unnecessary to bolster what it had already
determined was “substantial evidence on the record” to uphold the
236
discharge.
Whaley may be thought of as a forerunner of the heightened
attention that has more recently been given to assessing teacher
competencies. In the past, teacher competence assessments had
largely been confined to new or prospective teachers. Districts that
have attempted to discharge veteran teachers based upon
allegations of unsatisfactory student performance have often been
stymied by the courts’ reluctance to link student progress and
teacher behavior because of the difficulty, even impossibility, of
isolating a teacher’s performance from the many other variables
237
that affect learning and over which a teacher has no control.

230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 130.
236. Id.
237. For example, in Peter W. v. S. F. Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854,
861 (Ct. App. 1976) the court observed:
Substantial professional authority attests that the achievement of literacy
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Thus, Whaley is open to criticism from those who question
whether teachers should ever be discharged because of their
students’ performances. Others who might be willing to link
student progress to questions of competence may also question this
decision because the district had not established any specific
standards concerning teacher performance against which Whaley
could be assessed; there was only evidence that his students did not
238
measure up to other students.
There is also concern that the
index used to make that determination appears to have been
subjective. In any event, Whaley appears unique in its acceptance of
generalized charges of incompetence, such as poor teaching
results, limited pupil progress, and slow progress.
Turning to arbitration, the following case provides an
interesting contrast to the preceding judicial decisions.
In
239
Zwaschka v. Independent School District No. 84, Sleepy Eye, a special
education teacher who had been with the district for over twenty
years was proposed for discharge based on allegations that included
his failure to comply with the due process requirements of
240
students’ individual education plans (IEPs).
The teacher’s
negligence was described as “pervasive, persistent, and
241
numerous.”
In fact, one person who reviewed the records was
quoted as saying, “[T]his was way beyond the most severe, the
deepest, the largest, the most enormous mess they had ever seen,
way beyond anything they had ever been involved in . . . . The
242
problem was profound.”
The district alleged that Zwaschka’s
failure to complete the IEPs had resulted in its forfeiting federal
money for seven students and had put it at significant risk of
243
liability under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
Although Arbitrator Olson agreed that the evidence supported
discipline, she identified two reasons why the district did not have
just cause to discharge. First, she was persuaded that the district

in the schools, or its failure, are influenced by a host of factors which
affect the pupil subjectively, from outside the formal teaching process,
and beyond the control of its ministers. They may be physical,
neurological, emotional, cultural, environmental; they may be present
but not perceived, recognized but not identified.
238. Whaley, 325 N.W.2d at 128.
239. BMS Case No. 99-TD-6 (1999) (Olson, Arb.).
240. Id. at 3.
241. Id. at 13.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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itself was dilatory in meeting the special education standards and
that “this inequitable treatment should tend to soften the severity
244
with which Zwaschka’s conduct was judged.” Disparate treatment
is a well-accepted basis for overturning otherwise appropriate
discipline, and in this case Arbitrator Olson concluded that “[i]f
the district holds the standard of complete, current IEPs to one
teacher’s conduct, that standard must also be held against the
245
Second, Olson found it “[e]qually curious” that the
district.”
school district, in effect the high school principal, had long known
about the teacher’s lagging paperwork yet had done nothing about
246
it.
Despite the district’s assertion that “[w]e try to track down
anything that appears out of the usual,” no one had approached
247
the teacher to help or to warn him.
Thus, the district was once
again found not to have come to the hearing with “clean hands,”
and therefore could not use a standard in one instance that it
248
ignored in another.
Another matter of concern to school districts, and ultimately
to the courts and the arbitrators, is the issue of student discipline.
In 1974, the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed a case in which a
seven-year elementary education teacher was discharged based on
her “inability to maintain consistent discipline and appropriate
249
rapport necessary in teaching children.”
In reinstating the
teacher to her position, the court noted that during the teacher’s
previous seven years with the district she had “practically no
problems with discipline and no other teaching problems of
250
note.”
While acknowledging that immediately before her
discharge the teacher had encountered many discipline problems,
the court also observed that “[i]t also seems clear that some parents
251
were looking for something to complain about.”
From these
observations, it is apparent that the courts will be skeptical of
allegations raised for the first time well into a teacher’s long and
previously unblemished career.

244. Id. at 27.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 28.
248. Id.
249. Hardy v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 694, 301 Minn. 373, 374, 223 N.W.2d 124,
125 (1974).
250. Id. at 376, 223 N.W.2d at 127.
251. Id. at 377, 223 N.W.2d at 127.
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Licensure Issues

Discharging a teacher whose licensing status prevents him or
her from teaching raises related performance questions. Two
arbitration cases that preceded the discharge of a Lake Benton
teacher illustrate the complicated issues that can arise. In the first
arbitration, Arbitrator Olson weighed the evidence concerning
allegations of child abuse and reduced the teacher’s ninety-day
252
suspension to a sixty-day suspension.
After serving this
253
However,
suspension, the teacher returned to the classroom.
because of the nature of these charges, Minnesota law required the
254
district to report the matter to the State Board of Teaching.
In
turn, the Board of Teaching notified the teacher on December 15,
1999, that on December 10 it had suspended her license until
255
August 5, 2000.
The teacher, who had known of the state board’s pending
action and that it would mean she could no longer legally teach,
256
stopped coming to school on December 10.
However, her
attorney did not explain her absence to the superintendent until
receiving the formal suspension notice from the Board of Teaching
257
on December 15. Based upon this information, the school board
258
The notice cited
proposed the teacher’s immediate discharge.
the statutory grounds of insubordination, failure without justifiable
cause to teach without first securing a written release of the school
259
board, and willful neglect of duty.
In addition, the notice
described the factual basis for the action:
Suspension of your teaching license from December 10,
1999, to August 15, 2000, by the Board of Teaching (as
evidenced by the attached Stipulation Agreement),
making it impossible for you to fulfill your teaching duties
and resulting in the School District having to hire another
260
teacher to replace you.

252. Educ. Minn. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 404, Lake Benton, BMS Case No. 99PA-1050, 2 (1999) (Olson, Arb.).
253. Christenson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 404, Lake Benton, BMS Case No. 00TD-3, 2 (2000) (Ver Ploeg, Arb.).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 3-4.
256. Id. at 4.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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At the second arbitration, this dispute presented the rather
technical question: Whether Minnesota law—with its “cause”
requirement for discharge—applied to licensure questions such as
this and, if so, whether the district had proven that such cause
261
existed.
This case also presented a very human dilemma in that
the teacher was now losing her job for conduct that neither the
school district nor Arbitrator Olson had ever viewed as supporting
262
discharge.
Although the outcome in this case was “deeply troubling,” the
arbitrator who presided over the discharge hearing was unable to
find that the district had either a legal or a contract obligation to
ameliorate that harsh result in order to preserve an employment
relationship in which the teacher was legally unable to uphold her
263
end of the bargain.
Looking beyond the Continuing Contract
Act, the arbitrator concluded that when the teacher lost her
teaching license, albeit temporarily, by law she became
264
“unqualified” to teach.
The arbitrator could not distinguish this
situation from the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision in
265
Schumacher v. Independent School District No. 25, a 1990 case in
which a teacher’s teaching contract was found to have been void at
the time it was signed because he did not have a Minnesota
teaching license before he began teaching. Just as Schumacher
266
had “no right to entitlement to continued employment,” in the
Lake Benton case the arbitrator found that when this teacher
became unable to fulfill her responsibilities in the employment
267
relationship, her teaching contract became void.
Thus, the
district had no obligation to undertake unilateral efforts to
268
preserve her job throughout her suspension.
In contrast, in an arbitration involving the Red Lake School
District, the board proposed the superintendent for immediate

261. Id. at 8.
262. Id. at 12.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 9.
265. No. CX-90-1233, 1990 WL 163042 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
266. Id. at * 2.
267. Christenson, BMS Case No. 00-TD-3 at 12.
268. Id. at 10. In addition, the arbitrator agreed with the district that even if a
“cause” standard were applied to this case under the Continuing Contract Act,
there was cause to immediately discharge a teacher who was shown unable to teach
“without justifiable cause without first securing the written release of the school
board.” Id.
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discharge on the grounds that he had failed to renew his five-year
269
license. Arbitrator Reynolds reinstated the superintendent based
270
upon evidence that the lapse had been inadvertent. It had lapsed
at a time when the superintendent thought he was going to be
271
retiring, and he had re-instated it prior to his discharge.
Moreover, it was significant that the superintendent had never
272
misrepresented the situation.
Similarly, Arbitrator Gallagher rejected an argument that a
teacher had been insubordinate in failing to obtain a license to
273
teach in the area for which she had been hired.
He reinstated
the teacher based upon the fact that the teacher was licensed in
other subject areas, although not in the area where she had been
274
teaching under a one year variance.
C. Personal Behavior
While the preceding cases have explored questions of a
teacher’s professional competence and its effect on the educational
process, another even larger group of cases involves a teacher’s
personal behavior both at and away from school. The line between
these two categories of cases is often unclear. Certainly personal
behavior can have a direct impact upon the educational process,
and questions of professional competence sometimes stem from
personal difficulties. Moreover, notices of proposed discharges
often contain multiple charges that incorporate criticisms of both
professional competence and personal behavior. Nevertheless, for
purposes of this examination, the following cases are used to
explore more personal conduct, such as insubordination,
dishonesty, and both verbally and physically abusive behavior.
1.

High Standard of Conduct

In embarking upon this examination it is important to
recognize that Minnesota courts and arbitrators, like much of
society, tend to hold teachers to a high standard of conduct.
269. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 38, Red Lake v. Kroenke, BMS Case No. 95-VP-342,
4-5 (1994) (Reynolds, Arb.).
270. Id. at 12.
271. Id. at 4-5.
272. Id. at 9.
273. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 284, Wayzata v. Minn. Educ. Ass’n, BMS Case No. 03TD-5, 16-17 (2002) (Gallagher, Arb.).
274. Id.
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Arbitrator Miller spoke for many when he explained:
There is no doubt . . . that a teacher is placed in a position
of great responsibility by the District. The citizens of the
District place their faith and trust in this teacher to
nurture their children academically while at the same
time safeguarding their physical and mental well-being.
Thus, society has traditionally set high standards of moral
and legal behavior for teachers, often higher than in
other professional settings. On one hand, the teacher
who fulfills these responsibilities rightfully earns the
admiration and respect of the District, students, parents,
and community. On the other hand, the teacher who
abuses this trust by having sex with a student while in
school deserves not only scorn but swift removal from his
275
position.
This widely accepted view provides an important backdrop for
the following cases.
2.

Illustrative Cases

Minnesota law recognizes insubordination as a specific ground
276
for termination,
and insubordinate behavior also easily falls
within the statutory categories of “conduct unbecoming a
277
278
teacher” and “other good and sufficient grounds.”
In the case
279
of Ray v. Minneapolis Board of Education, Special School District No. 1,
the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the decision of appellant
school district, which found that a tenured teacher’s refusal to
participate in a review of the district’s educational program
280
constituted insubordination for which he could be discharged.
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that there is no
Minnesota statutory or common law definition of insubordination
and adopted the definition upon which the parties had agreed:
“Insubordination is a constant or continuing intentional refusal to
obey a direct or implied order, reasonable in nature, and given by
281
and with proper authority.” Applying this definition, the court
275. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 741, Paynesville v. Minn. Educ. Ass’n & Brad
Hanson, BMS Case No. 94-TD-12, 37 (1994) (Miller, Arb.).
276. MINN. STAT. §§ 122A.40, subd. 13(1), 122A.41, subd. 6(1) (2002).
277. See id. §§ 122A.40, subds. 9(c), 13(2), 122A.41, subd. 6(1).
278. See id. § 122A.40, subd. 9(d).
279. 295 Minn. 13, 202 N.W.2d 375 (1972).
280. Id. at 378.
281. Id.
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found that “[t]here is no question but that appellant had ample
opportunity to fill out the evaluation forms and that his responses
were purposely and intentionally incomplete, uncooperative,
282
unresponsive, and argumentative.”
Discharges based upon claims of insubordination typically
involve teachers who refuse bona fide orders from management or
otherwise challenge management’s proper exercise of its authority.
The general principle of “work now, grieve later,” which is so
central in the broader arena of labor relations, also applies in
education. A charge of insubordination requires proof that the
283
directive at issue was clear and that it was reasonable.
A 1994
decision by Arbitrator Flagler provides an interesting illustration of
284
a proposed discharge that failed because of these requirements.
In Arbitrator Flagler’s case, the Eden Prairie School District
argued that the teacher had been insubordinate when he failed to
285
refrain from physical contact with students as directed. However,
the evidence failed to prove an essential underlying element: that
the teacher had been given clear and effective notice of the
286
behaviors he was directed to avoid or correct. For example, when
the teacher asked the principal what he was doing wrong, he was
287
told in effect that “if you don’t already know, I can’t tell you.”
Flagler was also willing to take “arbitral notice,” based upon his own
many years of experience in education, that it is virtually impossible
to obey a directive to avoid physical contact with students under
any circumstance because students often initiate that physical
288
Thus, the teacher’s behavior could not be found
contact.
insubordinate when the directions given to him had been either
289
vague or unrealistic.
It was also relevant that where conduct
guidelines were clear and specific, the teacher rarely, if ever,
290
violated those guidelines.
Thus, none of the actions charged
against the teacher met the widely accepted arbitral definition of
insubordination: “A willful refusal to carry out a clear and proper

282. Id.
283. See Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 272, Eden Prairie v. Minn. Educ. Ass’n., BMS
Case No. 94-TD-6, 12 (1994) (Flagler, Arb.).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 2.
286. Id. at 12.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
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work directive, or any overt act to undermine or treat with
291
contempt, the authority of the employer and its agents.”
Evidence of verbal or physical abuse—whether labeled
insubordination or otherwise—will typically support a teacher’s
immediate discharge. This is true even if the teacher claims
unlawful discrimination. In Villarreal v. Independent School District
292
No. 659, a Mexican-American teacher who had been with the
Northfield School District for twenty-one years, and who had often
been described as a “good teacher,” was nevertheless discharged
293
based upon multiple occasions of verbal and physical abuse. The
teacher then filed a lawsuit alleging that the district had violated
294
Minnesota’s Human Rights Act by illegally and discriminatorily
295
discharging him.
In upholding the teacher’s discharge, the Minnesota Supreme
Court reviewed the charges and found that summary judgment in
296
favor of the school district was appropriate. The court concluded
that as the evidence had been sufficient to support Villareal’s
immediate discharge, he was precluded from making a prima facie
showing of racial discrimination, for an essential element of such a
claim is proof that one is qualified for the position in the first
297
place.
Similarly, arbitrators have not tolerated physical and
verbal abuse despite a teacher’s efforts to justify that behavior based
298
upon his cultural background, nor have they been accepting of
teachers who fail to acknowledge the inappropriateness of
291. Id.
292. 520 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. 1994).
293. Id. at 736.
294. MINN. STAT. § 363A.08, subd. 1(d) (Supp. 2003).
295. Villareal, 520 N.W.2d at 737.
296. Id. at 739.
297. Id. at 738 (citing Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 442
(Minn. 1983)). The Supreme Court's formulation in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) of the
plaintiff's prima facie case of discriminatory hiring slightly modified to fit a claim
of discriminatory discharge:
The discharged employee carries the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case by showing (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2)
he was qualified for the job from which he was discharged; (3) he was
discharged; and (4) the employer assigned a nonmember of the
protected class to do the same work.
Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 442.
298. See Minneapolis Pub. Sch. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis v.
Minneapolis Fed’n of Teachers, Local 59, AFT, AFL-CIO, BMS Case No. 95-TD-2
(1996) (Jacobowski, Arb.); Barnes-Griswold v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, St. Paul,
BMS Case No. 03-TD-6 (2003) (Ver Ploeg, Arb.).
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299

blameworthy behavior.
A teacher shown to be dishonest also has little latitude to
300
protest a discharge, especially if there has been a prior warning.
301
the
For example, in Anderson v. Independent School Dist. No. 623,
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the discharge of a school
teacher who lied about being sick in order to attend to personal
matters on a school day. In her appeal, the teacher relied upon an
earlier decision in which a district had been prevented from
discharging a teacher for taking one unauthorized day of sick
302
leave. Anderson argued that her case was “virtually identical” and
303
The court rejected that argument,
dictated the same result.
explaining that here the teacher had misused sick leave not once,
but twice, and had done so after being warned that such conduct
304
could be grounds for immediate discharge.
Although the court
agreed that discharge was a severe penalty, it apparently saw no way
to overturn the board’s discretion when the plain language of the
statute authorized a teacher’s immediate discharge when there was
a proven “[f]ailure without justifiable cause to teach without first
305
securing the written release of the school board . . . .”
Despite the harshness of this penalty, it is also true that giving
306
false information is viewed differently when it is not intentional.
For example, in Liffrig v. Independent School District No. 442, the
district discharged a seventeen-year high school principal
immediately for “immoral conduct” and “conduct unbecoming a
principal” based on evidence that he had (1) charged the school
district for hours of behind-the-wheel driver’s training that were
not given to the students, and (2) falsely certified to the State of
Minnesota and to various insurance companies that students had
completed the state mandated six hours of behind-the-wheel
307
driver’s training.
Agreeing that the principal’s records were by his own

299. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 112, Chaska v. Dr. Mario Cianflone, BMS Case No.
99-TD-2, 21 (1999) (Vernon, Arb.).
300. See Anderson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 623, 292 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. 1980).
301. 292 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. 1980).
302. Id. at 563.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 563-64.
306. See Liffrig v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 442, Oslo, 292 N.W.2d 726 (Minn.
1980).
307. Id. at 727.
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308

admission “shabby,” the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the
extent of the records that he did keep, many of which were in his
head, as well as the principal’s numerous responsibilities, and
309
concluded that his omissions had been unintentional. The court
defined “intent” as a “subjective state of mind usually established by
310
reasonable inference from surrounding circumstances.”
Thus,
although “the school board’s findings are entitled to respect, they
must be reversed when unsupported by substantial evidence in the
311
record.” Given the principal’s lack of intent to defraud, the court
312
overturned the discharge.
3.

Sexual Boundary Issues

No group of cases commands more public attention and
strong feeling than those that involve charges of improper
touching or sexual contact with students. It is difficult both to
pursue and to defend charges of this type because of their sensitive
nature and problems of proof. The growing numbers of these
cases illustrate their many complexities. For example, in cases that
typically pit a student’s charge against a teacher’s unequivocal
denial, how is credibility to be evaluated? Can a district choose not
to subject its students to the stress of testifying on these sensitive
matters and still meet its burden of proof? To what extent is there
a difference between verbal misconduct and physical misconduct?
Are there gradations of misconduct and, if so, at what point has a
teacher crossed permissible boundaries? What if the student
involved is a former student, now graduated?
The many Minnesota court and arbitration decisions that have
grappled with these issues have virtually unanimously upheld a
teacher’s immediate discharge when a district has proven that the
conduct complained of did in fact occur. This is not surprising
given the nature of these cases, the high standards to which a
teacher is held, and the unique nature of the teacher-student
relationship. Thus, as the following cases demonstrate, once
evidence is found to support the charges, the teacher’s immediate

308. Id. at 728.
309. Id. at 729.
310. Id. (citing State v. Schweppe, 306 Minn. 395, 401, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614
(1975)).
311. Id. at 730.
312. Id.
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313

discharge is never in real doubt.
That is why these cases typically
turn on the quality and quantity of evidence concerning the
essential question: Did the events charged actually occur? The
following cases illustrate the type of evidence that has been found
sufficient to meet a district’s burden of proof.
In one case, a twenty-two-year district employee was discharged
based on charges that many years earlier he had sexually molested
314
an elementary student over a four-year period.
At the hearing,
the student provided the only testimony concerning his claims that
he had been called “to the principal’s office once or twice a month
315
for visits that included sexual contact with the principal.”
The
student corroborated his testimony by diagramming the general
316
layout of the principal’s office and the adjoining general office.
This raised two fact issues: (1) was it physically possible for the
principal to have achieved the necessary privacy with the student,
and (2) was it possible that others would have failed to notice such
317
frequent visits?
Although the first question was easily resolved with evidence
that simply closing one door and lowering the window shades
would have provided the necessary privacy, the second was more
318
difficult. Two teachers and the principal’s secretary each testified
319
that they did not recall such frequent visits by the student.
However, they also admitted that it was difficult to recall anything
about incidents alleged to have occurred thirteen or more years
320
ago.
Given the uncertain nature of this evidence, the court of
appeals was obliged to directly consider whether the student or the
principal was more credible.
After first acknowledging its obligation to defer to the
judgment of fact finders who have seen and heard the witnesses

313. It is also important to note that Minnesota’s teacher organizations have
been very proactive in educating their members on boundary issues and where
there is compelling evidence that a teacher has violated those boundaries, they
often play an important role in quietly and privately facilitating the teacher’s
removal not only from the district, but sometimes also from the profession.
314. Fisher v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 622, N. St. Paul/Maplewood, 357 N.W.2d
152 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
315. Id. at 154.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
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321

and judged their credibility,
the court explained why it agreed
that the student was more credible. First, as in any case, it was
highly relevant that the student’s testimony about the abusive
behavior had been detailed and consistent. The court was also
impressed that the victim had accurately diagrammed both the
principal’s inner and outer offices, including the location of
furniture within the office and photographs of the principal’s
322
children, even though he had not been there for thirteen years.
Moreover, other witnesses’ testimony, “although not nearly as
critical,” established that the incidents could have taken place
323
without being observed.
It was undisputed that while children
were frequently called to the office, no records were kept of those
324
visits. The principal’s secretary also testified that she could not
325
recall ever interrupting him when his door was closed.
It is rare for any employee, including teachers, to be
disciplined for “old” events. Memories fade and evidence is no
longer available. Certainly remoteness was a relevant concern in
this case, for here the essential question involved events that
326
allegedly occurred between thirteen and seventeen years earlier.
Despite this concern, the court found that the passage of time
327
alone did not mean the teacher was denied due process. Noting
that Minnesota law has no time limits for immediately discharging a
teacher, the court found that the student’s twelve-year silence on
this matter did not render the incidents so remote as to have
328
unfairly prejudiced the principal.
Although it was true that
witnesses were unable to recall how often the student had visited
the principal’s office, that evidence was relatively unimportant
329
when compared with that of the only two “real witnesses.”
The
court explained that
[t]he sexual contact alleged here occurred in the private
confines of the principal’s office. It was not likely to
produce any corroborating evidence, nor is any required.

321.
1982)).
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id. at 155 (citing Estate of Serbus v. Serbus, 324 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 156.
Id.
Id.
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Appellant had a lengthy hearing on the charges,
conducted by an impartial hearing examiner, with every
opportunity for cross-examination. We believe that these
procedures were fundamentally fair and satisfied the
330
requirements of due process.
Providing further insight into its reasoning, the court cited
with favor a 1980 district court memorandum concerning a teacher
discharged for having sexual relations with a sixteen-year old
student three to four years earlier:
The fortuitous fact that the school board did not have
immediate knowledge of the alleged sexual relationship
with the sixteen-year old minor student is not the Board’s
fault. There is no showing that the Board unduly delayed
in bringing this termination action after it had received
knowledge of the alleged occurrence. By virtue of the
nature of the offense—sexual intercourse with a minor student of
the district—it may be considered doubtful whether such conduct
331
could ever be too remote in time.
Since 1991, when the legislature amended Minnesota law to
permit teachers to appeal their proposed discharges to arbitrators
332
rather than school boards and independent hearing examiners,
virtually all contested teacher discharges have been taken to
arbitration. Although arbitration decisions are not given the same
precedential weight as appellate court decisions, arbitration itself
has developed a body of common law that has guided the decisionmaking process in labor relations for many years and has added to
333
the earlier guidance provided by Minnesota courts. In addition,
arbitrators’ decisions typically provide more detailed discussions of
the evidence than do published judicial decisions.
One of the first cases taken to arbitration involved a thirty-twoyear counselor who had been employed in the Austin School
334
District for fifteen years.
Although the counselor had previously
330. Id.
331. Id. (citing Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 294, No. 12305 (Minn. 3d Dist.
Ct. Feb. 12, 1980) (mem.), in which “a teacher was discharged for having sexual
relations with a 16-year-old student despite the hearing taking place three to four
years after the incident”).
332. See MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 15 (2002).
333. See generally THE COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE: THE VIEW OF
ARBITRATORS § 6.6 (Theodore J. St. Antoine ed., 1998) [hereinafter THE COMMON
LAW].
334. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 492, Austin v. Minn. Educ. Ass’n, BMS Case No. 92TD-3 (1992) (Fogelberg, Arb.).
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been warned about complaints against him, additional complaints
335
Charges
arose in 1991 that triggered his proposed discharge.
included claims that the counselor had improperly disclosed
private data and had failed to file a mandatory report regarding an
336
incident or incidences of maltreatment.
However, the heart of
the case characterized as the “pivotal charge,” centered on the
events of a single day, when the counselor was alleged to have had
337
inappropriate sexual contact with his former counselee.
The
counselor vehemently denied the charges, and nearly 80 percent of
the hearing was devoted to evidence concerning that disputed
338
event. In his award, Arbitrator Fogelberg recognized that charges
of improper physical conduct are so self-evidently serious that “[i]f
the [e]mployer can meet their [sic] burden of proof concerning
this particular claim, then there is truly little need to consider the
balance of the evidence. Plainly it is a most serious charge and one
that under statute, allows the Board to terminate a tenured teacher
339
‘immediately.’”
Indeed, the association’s brief acknowledged
that if the counselor had assaulted the student in the manner
340
asserted, “he should not be teaching in the District.”
After a lengthy discussion of the evidence concerning the
student’s and the counselor’s credibility, including expert witness
testimony which the arbitrator described as “critical,” Arbitrator
Fogelberg accepted the student’s testimony and found that “the
preponderant evidence supports a finding that it is more probable
than not that the [g]rievant’s conduct on the day in question was
immoral and unbecoming a person who occupies a very influential
341
and sensitive position of trust within the school system.”
The
arbitrator was particularly persuaded that the student’s testimony
had largely been consistent, at least to an acceptable degree, and
other witnesses reported that the counselor had overstepped his
342
professional boundaries in dealing with other students.
In an equally interesting case that same year, the Paynesville
School District issued a notice of deficiency to a twelve-year band
335. Id. at 3.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 15.
338. Id.
339. Id. See also MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 8 (1990) (recodified by 1998
Minn. Laws 397 as MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 13 (2002)).
340. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 492, Austin, BMS Case No. 92-TD-3 at 15.
341. Id. at 38.
342. Id.
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director after a student filed a sexual harassment complaint against
343
him. The student’s parents were dissatisfied with this handling of
their daughter’s complaint and proceeded to conduct their own
investigation, telephoning former students to determine whether
344
the band director might have sexually harassed them as well.
One student who initially denied having been sexually harassed
later retracted her statement and alleged that she had had sex with
the band director several times when she had been in high
345
school. In addition, the parents learned that yet another former
student had recently filed sexual harassment charges against the
band director, who in addition to his job at the high school, was
346
giving music lessons at the college she was currently attending.
After the parents brought this additional information to the
district’s attention, the board adopted a resolution proposing the
band director’s immediate discharge based upon twelve specific
factual grounds that Arbitrator Miller later grouped into three
347
broad categories.
The first group of allegations involved the student who had
348
graduated from high school the prior year. She complained that
since that time the band director, who gave music lessons at the
college she was attending, had inappropriately complimented her
physical appearance and had made sexually provocative
349
comments.
The band director did not deny that he had given
350
her presents or hugged her and kissed her under the mistletoe.
A college investigation of the matter found the band director’s
actions to be inappropriate, and he was warned that similar future
351
behavior could lead to further discipline including termination.
Although the band director claims he was never notified of this
352
report, he nevertheless resigned his position at the college.
It was not until the arbitration hearing that this student for the

343. Indep. Sch Dist. 741, Paynesville v. Minn. Educ. Ass’n, BMS Case No. 94TD-12 (1994) (Miller, Arb.).
344. Id. at 3.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 3-4.
347. Id. at 4.
348. Id. at 9.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 10.
351. Id. at 11-12.
352. Id. at 12.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss1/9

50

Ver Ploeg: Terminating Public School Teachers for Cause Under Minnesota Law
VERPLOEG(LS &CB).DOC

2004]

10/3/2004 9:42:09 PM

TERMINATING PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS

353
353

first time alleged that the director had also sexually touched her.
However, Arbitrator Miller indicated he would not consider those
belated allegations as they had not been included in the proposed
354
notice of discharge.
Moreover, he held that because this alleged
conduct occurred off school premises on the band director’s own
time the district had failed to prove a connection to his position in
355
the high school.
The second group of allegations involved the student whose
parents had pursued this investigation. This student—who had
been a high school junior and suffered from a serious heart
condition—became uncomfortable when the band director
showered her with attention, including giving her sentimental gifts,
hugs, joking with her in a sexual fashion, tickling her, and having
356
their picture taken together. Arbitrator Miller indicated that had
these been the only charges against the band director he would
have found the district’s initial notice of deficiency to have been
357
appropriate.
This is particularly interesting, as it was these
parents’ dissatisfaction with that very notice that had caused them
to undertake their own investigation that led to the proposed
discharge at issue.
The third and most damning complaint concerned a third
accuser’s allegations that she and the director had sexual
intercourse four times and oral sex once when that witness had
358
been a senior at the high school ten years earlier.
Everyone
understood that the credibility of these allegations would
359
In an
determine whether the band director retained his job.
apparently riveting “she said, he said” fashion, the band director
challenged the allegations by asking why, if the allegations were
360
true, did the woman thereafter invite him to her wedding?
Why
did she and her husband both take golf lessons from him, and why
would they have invited the director and his family to visit them
361
when they vacationed in North Dakota?
Arbitrator Miller looked to the victim’s husband for the
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

Id.
Id..
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15-17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 30.
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362

answers to these questions.
The husband was a minister, and as
363
His “very
such was someone who “preaches forgiveness of sin.”
forthright” testimony and his rationale for his and his wife’s
364
decision to forgive was described as totally believable:
Given his strong religious beliefs, their decision, and
especially his decision, was based on the teachings of their
religion, which mandates to forgive and befriend their
enemies. It therefore should come as no surprise to
anyone that [the husband] was willing to forgive Mr.
Hanson for his transgressions against his wife and still be
365
cordial to Mr. Hanson and his family.
Other evidence supported the district. For example, an
experienced licensed psychologist explained how the former
student had been raised to be submissive and to obey authority
figures and that she was “not in a position to say no” to the band
366
director’s sexual advances. Arbitrator Miller took special note of
the fact that there had been no expert witness to testify for the
367
band director.
The expert who did interview him, and who
administered three separate personality tests (MMPI-II, California
Personality Inventory and a Rorschach) did not testify to the truth
368
of the director’s denials. It was also noteworthy that the director
had absolutely every reason to lie, for “his reputation, career and
369
even his marriage are at stake.” In contrast, the complainant had
nothing to gain and everything to lose from testifying
against Mr. Hanson. In order to testify in this hearing,
she was forced to disclose her extramarital affair. This
disclosure was painful to her husband and their marriage.
It could also damage his career in the clergy and their
family’s reputation in the community and church. It is
difficult to imagine that anyone would subject herself to
this type of scrutiny, in order to make false accusations
370
against someone.
The psychologist confirmed this observation, testifying that the

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id.
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woman’s personality and upbringing as a “good Christian girl”
made it very unlikely that she would fabricate a story concerning
371
having sex with the band director if that were not true. For these
reasons the arbitrator concluded that the band director had
committed a “heinous act” when he had sex with a high school
372
student, and he deserved no leniency whatsoever. Arbitrator
Miller stated, “A teacher does not need to be warned that it is
wrong to have sexual intercourse with a student. In fact, proof of a
teacher’s sexual acts with a student is sufficient grounds for
373
immediate discharge.”
One difficulty that often arises in these cases is a lengthy time
period between alleged incidents of improper behavior and a
district’s response. This is, of course, often due to victims’ notuncommon reluctance to report such sensitive incidents because of
embarrassment, guilt, intimidation, or ignorance that the conduct
was wrongful. Sometimes, incidents dealt with at the time later
resurface in the context of a larger pattern of behavior. For
example, in 1998 Arbitrator Imes heard evidence that
approximately seven years earlier a fifteen-year-old female student
had joined her music teacher and his wife at their home to watch
television, at which time the teacher had put his hand under her
374
sweatshirt and touched her “bra-covered breasts.”
The student
recorded this incident in her diary and eventually told her friends
375
and her parents. When she also told two teachers and the school
counselor, the superintendent reported the matter to the police
(who did not file charges) and told the teacher that he would be
376
discharged if there was another similar incident.
The teacher
eventually apologized to the student and they were still friends at
377
the time of the hearing.
Five years after the incident, the district hired a new
superintendent who eventually learned of this incident from the
president of the local union who was seeking to protect other
378
teachers who were being laid off for budgetary reasons.
In the
371. Id. at 35.
372. Id. at 37.
373. Id. at 39.
374. Gillson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 116, Pillager, BMS Case No. 98-TD-13, 2
(1998) (Imes, Arb.).
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
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course of following up on this report, the superintendent also
discovered that the teacher was spending many late nights at school
379
on his computer.
Further investigation revealed that he was
visiting sites with pictures of nude and partially undressed women,
some of which he downloaded, and that he had also downloaded
380
two short movie clips the district described as pornographic.
Arbitrator Imes reviewed the evidence and found the
381
Nevertheless, she concluded that with
allegations to be true.
respect to the initial incident that had occurred in the early 1990s,
for which the teacher had been given what was characterized as an
382
“oral warning,” discipline now would constitute double jeopardy.
Rejecting the argument that double jeopardy only applies to
criminal proceedings, Imes held that the teacher could not now be
383
punished a second time for the same behavior.
This case is also an interesting forerunner of what has come to
be a growing number of workplace “internet abuse” cases. It arose
at a time when employers were only starting to recognize the extent
to which some employees were abusing their internet privileges,
with much of that activity involving sexual content so that claims of
sexual harassment began to emerge as a real concern. With this
growing risk, many employers have now adopted formal policies
that restrict employee use of the computers, especially with respect
to sexually oriented sites. However, at the time of this hearing it is
not surprising that this district did not have such a policy.
Although Arbitrator Imes acknowledged that one could
credibly argue that it should be unnecessary to advise employees
not to view and download material of such questionable taste, she
nevertheless found that “an incident of this nature does not rise to
384
a level that sustains immediate discharge.” Declining to find that
this action, “while incredibly stupid,” was so harmful as to warrant
immediate discharge, Imes did express her opinion that the
385
teacher’s conduct did warrant some type of discipline. However,
because neither party had proposed a lesser penalty at the hearing,
she lacked the authority to issue a lesser penalty on her own

379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
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386

initiative.
In contrast, in a more recent case Arbitrator Fogelberg upheld
the discharge of a high school instructor found to have
downloaded approximately seventy-five to eighty pages of
pornographic material from his computer at school during his
387
prep time.
In addition, the instructor had accumulated
hundreds of pages of anarchist material on a variety of subjects
such as how to bomb a building, make explosives, tap into
telephones, steal credit card numbers, make firecrackers, use
388
dynamite and more.
Fogelberg rejected each of the instructor’s
three lines of defense: (1) that he had been given no clear policy,
(2) that he had insufficient warning that his behavior was not
389
acceptable, and (3) that there had been no harm.
In doing so,
he reiterated the widely-held view that some conduct is so clearly
objectionable that specific directives and warnings of consequences
are unnecessary: “A teacher viewing and downloading pornography
in a high school setting, while ‘on the job’ would know, or should
have known, that accessing such materials was highly inappropriate
390
and not without serious consequences if discovered.”
More recently, Arbitrator Olson ordered a one-semester
suspension without pay and a psychological evaluation with
counseling by a qualified professional of the District’s choosing and
at the teacher’s expense, after finding that a teacher had shown
one objectionable computer image to young students and had kept
391
other inappropriate images on a district computer.
Although
Arbitrator Olson was unwilling to uphold the teacher’s immediate
discharge based upon this evidence, she was also unwilling to give a
mere “slap on the wrist” with a written reprimand or a short
392
In striking this balance, Arbitrator Olson itemized
suspension.
the evidence that had been important to her decision:
I consider this teacher’s audience of vulnerable
adolescents and their emerging response to sexuality; the
teacher’s admission that he was familiar with the two
386. See infra Part VII.
387. Educ. Minn. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis, BMS Case No. 00TD-4 (2000) (Fogelberg, Arb.).
388. Id. at 4.
389. Id. at 10.
390. Id. at 16.
391. Educ. Minn. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 622, N. St. Paul-Maplewood-Oakdale,
BMS Case No. 02-TD-8 (2002) (Olson, Arb.).
392. Id. at 13.
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relevant District policies and knew his computer images
would violate them; the possibility of unwanted and
unexpected intrusion of sexual images on District staff
whose duties are to monitor the District’s computers; the
apparent appeal of vulgar sexual images for the teacher;
his lack of understanding, even at hearing, of his
misconduct; parental concerns about returning this
teacher to the classroom.
Balanced against those matters are these facts: only one
student complained about the cactus picture and then
only to her friends, not to the District; the four images
found on his computer were not seen by the students; no
witness refuted his denial about the cartoons; the
teacher’s ten-year record of service without incident; the
relative ease with which the teacher’s inappropriate
computer use can be rectified; the reluctance of the
courts to uphold termination if behavior can be changed;
the willingness of the District to propose a lesser penalty
393
than discharge.
Arbitrator Olson’s list illustrates the extent to which the
growing number of “on-line pornography” cases has now developed
widely accepted guidelines, and can provide helpful guidance in
similar cases.
D. Off-Duty Misconduct
The larger arena of labor relations has long presumed that an
employee’s private life is beyond an employer’s control and that
employers are not society’s enforcers. Only when an employer can
show a connection—a “nexus”—between off-duty misconduct and
an adverse effect on the business, does the employer have a
legitimate interest in what would otherwise be considered the
employee’s personal activities.
Sometimes, a collective bargaining agreement will specify the
type of off-duty conduct for which an employer can discipline an
employee and there will be no need to prove nexus. However, most
often an employer will be forced to demonstrate a causal
connection between that conduct and the workplace.
The
National Academy of Arbitrators has identified the four most
common ways to show nexus:

393.

Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss1/9

56

Ver Ploeg: Terminating Public School Teachers for Cause Under Minnesota Law
VERPLOEG(LS &CB).DOC

2004]

10/3/2004 9:42:09 PM

TERMINATING PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS

359

(a) Misconduct involving harm or threats to supervisors,
co-workers, customers, or others with an actual or
potential business relationship with the employer;
(b) Misconduct that could seriously damage an
employer’s public image;
(c) Misconduct that reasonably makes it difficult or
impossible for co-workers, customers, or others with an
actual or potential business relationship with the
employer to deal with the employee; or
(d) Public attacks on the employer, supervisors or the
394
employer’s product.
Nexus raises special considerations in education because many
courts and arbitrators hold teachers to a higher standard of
behavior. This higher standard of behavior is not only applied to
teachers’ duties at school, but also to their private lives away from
school. There are occasions when doing so is reasonable. For
example, it would not be difficult to find a harm, or threat of harm,
to students when a teacher has abused a child outside of the school.
In fact, the Academy expressly cites the examples of a “teacher
convicted of child abuse away from work and a drug counselor
convicted of selling drugs away from work” as “clear examples of
situations in which the employer’s image might be irreparably
395
A teacher
harmed if it retained the offending employee.”
arrested for immoral behavior or drug-related activities, whose
arrest is widely reported, may have difficulty continuing to function
effectively in the classroom.
Thus, education cases add unique dimensions to the question
of nexus. The Minnesota Court of Appeal’s 1987 decision In re
396
Proposed Discharge of Donald Lee Shelton illustrates some of these
considerations.
In Shelton, three district teachers formed a
397
computer corporation.
One served as secretary/treasurer and
398
Six years
was the sole signatory for all corporate bank accounts.
into the venture the two other teachers confronted the
secretary/treasurer with evidence of his unauthorized withdrawal
399
of corporate funds.
The teacher admitted that he had been
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

THE COMMON LAW, supra note 333, at 168.
Id. at 169.
408 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 595.
Id.
Id.
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stealing funds for over two years and had also forged the others’
400
signatures on personal bank guarantees. They reported this theft
to the sheriff’s department, and the teacher agreed to return his
401
shares of stock to the corporation and pay restitution.
That fall the teacher returned to his seventh and twelfth grade
402
social studies classrooms. Later, when his theft became common
knowledge throughout the community, staff members were divided
403
A substitute teacher who
concerning his continued teaching.
covered the teacher’s social studies classes during a seven-week
medical leave that January reported difficulty controlling those
classes, and there was evidence that the senior class was unusually
404
disruptive throughout the year.
In March, the teacher was
charged with theft by swindle and on May 30, he pled guilty to one
405
At the end of
count of theft as full prosecution for his offenses.
the school year the school board proposed the teacher’s immediate
discharge, citing his theft as immoral conduct and conduct
406
unbecoming a teacher. Before this incident, his teaching record
407
had been unblemished.
After hearing this matter, the hearing examiner recommended
that the board rescind the proposed discharge because “no
evidence exists to suggest that the teacher is not fully remediated or
that there is a likelihood that he will commit a similar crime in the
408
Nevertheless, the school board voted unanimously to
future.”
discharge the teacher, having concluded that his stealing over
$35,000 had “resulted in an irremediable deterioration of faculty
relations, inability to effectively teach because of lack of credibility
409
and adverse relationship with the community.”
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered the
teacher’s argument that he should be given the opportunity to
demonstrate his ability to continue teaching because there was no
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. In August, the trial court sentenced the teacher to a ninety-day
misdemeanor sentence and ordered him to complete his restitution to the
corporation by May 1, 1987 by paying $2571.73. The court stayed sixty days of his
sentence and placed him on one-year probation. Id. at 596.
406. Id. at 596.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
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410

direct relationship between his conduct and his fitness to teach.
Shelton insisted that he had not lost his credibility in the
classroom, citing the testimony of students who had welcomed his
411
return from surgery and respected his ability to face his mistakes.
However, the district argued that the teacher, who taught in the
area of business ethics and social studies, had lost his credibility to
teach such values and that his presence created turmoil within the
412
faculty. The teacher countered by arguing that he should not be
held responsible for turmoil incited by others, particularly by his
two former partners who were leading the opposition against
413
him.
The court considered these arguments and, after noting the
paucity of evidence or findings concerning student reaction to the
teacher’s continued presence, nevertheless agreed that it had been
a “strongly emotional” school year for the faculty and that “[w]hile
relator may be genuinely sorry for, and may be unlikely to repeat,
his conduct, the record does support the school board’s conclusion
that relator’s continued presence in this small school district will
result in faculty disorder and an unsatisfactory learning
414
environment.”
One interesting aspect of the court’s discussion of this case is
the observation that although the teacher’s misconduct rendered
him unable to continue teaching in Blooming Prairie, apparently
he was still well qualified to teach in any other district:
Relator still has his teaching license and can continue in
his profession. Faculty members testified relator is well
qualified to teach in any other district. Had this matter
arisen in a larger school district, it is likely reassignment of
relator to another school within the district would suffice
as a remedy. But given the small size of the Blooming
Prairie school district and the high school which houses
grades 7-12, it is not error to conclude relator’s ‘conduct
can only be remedied by his removal as a teacher in the
415
Blooming Prairie Schools.’
416
Similarly, in a case involving the Duluth School District,
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

Id. at 598.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, Duluth & Grievant, BMS Case No. 99-TD-5
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Arbitrator Berquist reviewed the proposed demotion of a school
principal to the rank of teacher for shoplifting six items of clothing
417
with a total value of $311.
The principal sought to explain her
conduct with evidence that at the time of the incident she had
been on pain relievers, and this had left her “confused” and
418
“spacey.”
Demoting the principal to the rank of teacher would
have placed her at the bottom of the seniority list, with a loss of
419
$11,000 a year and over twenty years’ seniority.
In weighing the evidence, Arbitrator Berquist was persuaded
that the principal sincerely believed that her medications had
played a part in this unfortunate event, and he found that “the
420
record does not support a finding of dishonesty” on her part. In
addition, he specially noted that this incident had occurred off-duty
421
on a Sunday, and that it “had no connection with the District.”
He accepted that an employer can discipline for otherwise private
conduct if that conduct “(1) harms the employer’s business; (2)
adversely affects the employee’s ability to perform his or her job; or
422
(3) leads other employees to refuse to work with the recalcitrant.”
However, he concluded that those exceptions did not apply in this
case, where the only apparent linkage was a press release
423
concerning the matter.
This was not enough to support
424
discipline for “such private conduct.”
E. The Troubled Teacher
Difficult issues arise when a district proposes to discharge a
teacher whose misconduct relates to psychological problems or
chemical dependency.
Recent years have seen a growing
acceptance of the medical dimensions of these cases. This has led
to an increased willingness to give a teacher a second chance (often
characterized as a “last chance”) if the condition has been or
probably can be treated and the misconduct is not likely to be
repeated. However, a discharge will be directed if it appears that

(1999) (Berquist, Arb.).
417. Id. at 1.
418. Id. at 11.
419. Id. at 18.
420. Id. at 22.
421. Id. at 28.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
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remedial efforts are not likely to succeed, or the teacher can no
longer be an effective peer for colleagues or role model for
students.
An arbitration involving the Moorehead School District
425
illustrates many of these issues.
In that case, a tenured teacher
with no prior discipline had called in sick and then gone on a
426
drinking binge. After he urinated and exposed himself in public,
and nearly caused a car accident, police apprehended the teacher
427
and put him in jail.
After learning of these events, the
Moorehead School Board weighed the egregious nature of this
conduct, the fact that it occurred during the school day, and the
widespread publicity that followed. The school board proposed the
teacher’s immediate discharge on the grounds of “immoral
conduct . . . conduct unbecoming a teacher which requires the
teacher’s removal from the classroom . . . and/or willful neglect of
428
429
duty.” The arbitrator discussed each of these grounds in detail.
First, the arbitrator agreed while the teacher’s conduct had
430
been “unbecoming,” it could not be characterized as “immoral.”
Relying on Webster’s Dictionary to equate immorality with
“wickedness” or “vice,” the arbitrator found that this behavior,
“although truly inappropriate, embarrassing and illegal, lacked
431
sufficient volition and malice to be deemed ‘immoral.’”
Similarly, the arbitrator defined “willful” as “deliberate” and
“intentional,” and found that such was not the case given the
evidence that the teacher’s conduct was entirely attributable to his
alcoholism and his then-undiagnosed depression, both recognized
432
as diseases.
With the above findings, the essential question then became:
Was the teacher’s undisputed conduct so egregious that it required
433
the teacher’s “immediate discharge” from the classroom?
The
district argued that his conduct was so egregious, he could no
longer be a “positive role model” and he had violated the “very

425. Daly v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 152, Moorhead, BMS Case No. 00-TD-2
(2000) (Ver Ploeg, Arb.).
426. Id. at 2-3.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 5-6.
429. Id. at 6-9.
430. Id. at 7-8.
431. Id. at 7.
432. Id. at 8-9.
433. Id. at 9-10.
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principles” he was expected to impart to his tenth grade health
434
In
students, as expressly directed in their curriculum.
considering this argument the parties agreed that “teachers are
435
viewed as role models for students.”
Nevertheless, the teacher
was reinstated after the arbitrator applied the criteria first
articulated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Kroll v. Independent
436
School District No. 593.
Kroll directed fact-finders to first consider a teacher’s prior
437
record.
However, here the parties had staked out very different
positions concerning what constituted the teacher’s “prior
438
record.” The district acknowledged that it had never disciplined
or otherwise directed the teacher concerning his use of alcohol,
and there was no evidence that he ever taught or was even on
439
school premises while impaired.
Nor was his classroom
440
performance at issue.
Thus, if the teacher’s prior record was
limited to his employment record, this factor would weigh against
discharge. However, the district countered that the “record”
should be defined more expansively to embrace the teacher’s
public and private life, based on evidence that
[s]ince junior high the Teacher has experienced sobriety
for a period of only three and one-half years. He was in
treatment three previous times, and arrested and
convicted three times for alcohol related crimes, two of
which were DUI’s. Notwithstanding his prior treatment
and his lengthy participation in AA, the Teacher’s lack of
441
control has only worsened.
Thus, the question was whether the teacher’s “prior record”
extended to his entire life history, including his off-duty conduct,
or whether inquiry was limited to his “employment record with the
442
The arbitrator decided this question by stating,
District.”
“Without denying the relevance of a teacher’s entire course of
conduct, in this case I find the lack of any evidence of alcohol

434. Id. at 7-8.
435. Id. at 8.
436. Id. at 10-20 (citing Kroll v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 593, 304 N.W.2d 338
(Minn. 1981), also discussed supra Part V).
437. Id. at 11 (citing Kroll, 304 N.W.2d at 345).
438. See id. at 12-17.
439. Id. at 16.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 17.
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related use or impairment associated with the Teacher’s teaching
duties to be highly relevant. This evidence falls short of Kroll’s first
443
factor.”
Next it was necessary to consider how serious the teacher’s
444
The teacher’s attorney argued that
conduct had been.
immediate discharge cases typically involve “teachers accused of
‘bad acts’ such as sexual or physical abuse of students,” and urged
445
that this was not so serious a case.
The teacher had never been
under the influence or “in any way impaired . . . while teaching or
446
otherwise on school property.” Nor had he ever been disciplined
447
or otherwise directed concerning his alcohol use. The arbitrator
considered, but ultimately did not accept this argument by
reasoning that even though these events had not occurred on
school premises or with students, they “did occur during the school
448
day.” Moreover, it could be assumed that all of the students were
aware of what had happened and that this knowledge had
consequences:
The District has had to deal with the very real—although
perhaps intangible—consequences of having someone
who should have been a role model and authority figure
demonstrate the very behavior that adults fear most on
the part of impressionable teens. The fallout from the
449
Teacher’s behavior should not be underestimated.
For many of the same reasons the arbitrator found the teacher’s
conduct to be serious, that conduct was also found to pose “actual
450
or threatened harm” and thus met Kroll’s third factor.
Nevertheless, the arbitrator tempered that conclusion with the
observation that
[h]owever, it may also be true that the enormity of these
events, of which all the students must surely be aware, may
also serve to impress upon them the power of chemical
dependency and the fragility of the human condition. If
the Teacher returned to the classroom and maintained a
successful fight against his disease—a battle which he

443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 18.
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must fight for the rest of his life for there is no “cure” for
alcoholism—the courage of his fight could well permit
him to regain, and perhaps even surpass, his earlier
451
positive influence on students.
Finally, the arbitrator had to determine whether the teacher’s
452
conduct could have been corrected with a warning. The greatest
portion of the award was devoted to weighing the competing
evidence and arguments concerning the teacher’s future ability to
453
overcome his alcoholism and depression.
The district argued
that if the teacher had been able to control his drinking, then he
would have done so following his three earlier efforts in treatment
454
and after his three convictions for alcohol-related crimes.
In
essence, the district’s position was, “[t]he buck must stop
455
sometime, and that time is now.”
The teacher’s representative
was more optimistic, offering evidence that the teacher had
accepted responsibility for his actions, was following “every medical
456
recommendation” and that his prognosis was good.
There is no guarantee that a person will avoid a future
457
“The question is whether there are enough promising
relapse.
indicators to warrant” giving a teacher a chance to save his or her
458
career.
Here the arbitrator relied upon three promising
459
First, it was “evident
indicators to give the teacher that chance.
that the Teacher’s misconduct had been the product of not only
460
his life-long alcoholism, but also a closely linked depression.”
Until shortly before the arbitration, that depression had never been
461
recognized or treated.
The teacher had been on medications
that appeared to be making a difference, and the arbitrator
determined that “[t]his treatment deserves an opportunity to prove
462
itself.”
Second, the district had neither challenged the teacher’s
classroom performance nor claimed until now that his alcoholism
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.

Id.
Id. at 18-20.
See id.
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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463

ever “infringed upon his teaching duties.”
Thus, although the
teacher had been unable to deal with his alcoholism in his private
life, the district itself had “never been called upon to give him a
464
‘second chance.’” The arbitrator held that it should at least give
465
the teacher a “last chance” now.
Third, accepting the conventional wisdom that many
alcoholics must “hit bottom” before they can improve, the
arbitrator concluded that these events must surely represent the
“bottom” for the teacher and if ever he were to understand the
enormity of his illness and its consequences, “surely now is the
466
time.”
Thus, the arbitrator did not order the teacher’s immediate
discharge. However, in recognition of the seriousness of this
467
misconduct, he was issued a sixty-day unpaid suspension.
That
suspension was to be served at the district’s discretion and
468
scheduled to “best accommodate its curricular needs.” In issuing
this suspension, the arbitrator warned the teacher that he was “now
469
on notice that he will be held to a very high standard of conduct.”
He had been given what might be characterized as a “last chance,”
and “[a]ny future relapse and subsequent claim of remediability
will surely be viewed with a much more jaundiced eye than has now
470
been the case.”
However, the arbitrator also expressed the
sincere hope “that the Teacher will fulfill the pledge he has made
in this proceeding to commit himself to a life of sobriety. If he
does so, he will win the admiration of his students, colleagues,
471
family and community.”
F.

Medical Leaves and Disability

The discharge of a teacher for disability related reasons also
472
raises difficult issues. While the Teacher Tenure Act is largely
silent on the subject, subdivision 12 of the Continuing Contract Act

463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 122A.41 (2002).
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contains detailed provisions that govern the treatment of a teacher
while on disability, and subdivision 13 provides that a district may
immediately discharge a teacher who has been on disability for
twelve months and is unable to qualify for reinstatement under the
473
procedures of subdivision 12.
In select cases, discharge for
medical or disability reasons can provide a mutually beneficial way
to tactfully remove a teacher who might otherwise be discharged
for performance problems or personal misconduct.
The Continuing Contract Act provides that a teacher may be
placed on a leave of absence when he or she is shown to have
“active tuberculosis or other communicable disease, mental illness,
474
drug or alcohol addiction, or some other serious incapacity.”
During that leave the teacher must be given his or her accumulated
sick leave benefits, and a district may in its discretion also grant
475
additional benefits.
A teacher who protests being placed on
medical leave has the right to a district-paid medical examination
by a doctor that he or she may select from a list of three names
provided by the board, and failure to submit to the exam in the
476
prescribed time subjects the teacher to immediate discharge.
The doctor’s report concerning the teacher’s medical condition is
477
then presumably binding, with one exception. If mental illness is
claimed, then the teacher and the board convene a panel of three
physicians or psychiatrists who will examine the teacher and submit
their findings and conclusions, which are also presumably
478
binding.
The district must reinstate a teacher following a
medical leave after receiving medical verification within one year
479
that he or she has sufficiently recovered to return to teaching.
Aside from these requirements a district can place a teacher
on medical leave without providing a hearing, for such leave is
neither a discharge nor a demotion under the statute. For
480
example, in Palmer v. Independent School District No. 917, a teacher
was found to have properly been placed on a medical leave of
absence when her physician, with her approval, reported that she
should have no more than four hours of student contact time per
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.

MINN. STAT. §§ 122A.40, 122A.41 (2002).
Id. § 122A.40, subd. 12.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
547 N.W.2d 899 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
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day. When the district reduced her schedule to a .75 full-time
equivalency to accommodate those restrictions, the teacher
protested that she was entitled to have the balance of her hours
instead assigned to non-student activities, in effect, paperwork and
481
482
meetings scheduled to suit her needs. The court did not agree.
As a related matter, a teacher who is otherwise subject to
discharge for cause cannot alternatively assert a right to take a leave
of absence for medical reasons. In Obermeyer v. School Board,
483
Independent School District No. 282, the Minnesota Supreme Court
resolved possible confusion between the discharge for cause
484
485
In Obermeyer, one
provisions and the medical leave provisions.
week after the teacher requested a leave of absence to obtain
treatment for alcoholism he pled guilty to having taken indecent
486
liberties with a minor male student one month earlier.
After a
hearing, the board discharged the teacher for immoral conduct
and at the same time determined that his request for a leave of
487
absence was moot because he was no longer a district employee.
The teacher appealed to the district court, arguing that he should
488
have been given a disability hearing before the discharge hearing.
In affirming the district court’s rejection of this claim, the
Minnesota Supreme Court observed that “[a] mere reading of the
statute makes clear that appellant is reading into it something
489
which it does not provide.”
A teacher does not have a right to a
490
suspension and leave of absence.
Rather, the language clearly
demonstrates that the legislature’s intent was to prevent a district
from discharging a teacher solely on the ground of serious mental
491
or physical disability until twelve months passed.
However, this
does not prevent a district from discharging a teacher for other
492
statutory reasons.
Other disability issues arise when a teacher returns to work

481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.

Id. at 901.
Id. at 906.
311 Minn. 232, 247 N.W.2d 919 (1976).
MINN. STAT. § 122A.40, subd. 13 (2002).
Id. § 122A.40, subd. 12.
Obermeyer, 247 N.W.2d at 919.
Id.
Id. at 920.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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under medical restrictions and then claims that the district has
failed to honor those restrictions. For example, in a case involving
493
the Red Lake School District, a teacher who missed two years of
work following a work-related car accident returned to teaching
under the following restrictions: no prolonged posturing, no lifting
or carrying over twenty pounds, needs semi-sedentary work that
allows frequent change in body position, and full-time classroom
494
work only.
In the fall of 1998, the district assigned the teacher to the
495
position of High School In-School Suspension (ISS) Supervisor.
Despite the district’s extensive efforts to accommodate that
position to the teacher’s medical restrictions and personal
496
concerns, the teacher questioned his ability to deal with students
whose behavioral problems caused them to be assigned to ISS in
497
the first place.
Thus, he refused to work the assignment,
claiming that his doctor and his qualified rehabilitation consultant
(QRC) had both advised him that if he thereafter suffered another
on-the-job injury, his current “generous level of Workers
498
Compensation benefits could be jeopardized.”
In light of this
continued refusal to accept the ISS assignment, the district
proposed the teacher’s immediate discharge for insubordination,
499
failure to teach, and willful neglect of duties.
The teacher candidly admitted that the ISS position
technically accommodated his restrictions, as it would permit him
500
to move freely at any time and required no lifting.
His sole
concern was that he could not handle the students assigned to
493. Indep. Sch. Dist. 38 & Grievant, BMS Case No. 99-TD-4 (1999) (Ver
Ploeg, Arb.).
494. Id. at 2.
495. Id. at 3.
496. Id.
There is undisputed evidence that in making this assignment the District
altered the ISS room and surrounding area to accommodate the
Teachers medical restrictions and perceived concerns. The District
provided a special parking space for him immediately outside the ISS
room; it stationed a security guard who would otherwise be in that wing
of the building outside of the ISS room; and it installed several security
and communications devices in the ISS room: a video camera, walkie
talkie, and telephone.
Id.
497. Id. at 3.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 4.
500. Id. at 7.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss1/9

68

Ver Ploeg: Terminating Public School Teachers for Cause Under Minnesota Law
VERPLOEG(LS &CB).DOC

2004]

10/3/2004 9:42:09 PM

TERMINATING PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS

371

501

ISS.
The arbitrator did not accept this argument, agreeing with
the district that to the extent that any student might pose a physical
502
threat, that threat also exists in any other classroom.
Moreover,
the district had provided exceptional security measures for the ISS
503
room.
Nevertheless, the arbitrator declined to order the teacher’s
discharge on the grounds that his refusal to accept the assignment
had been reasonable, given that “doing so without formal medical
authorization could jeopardize his workers’ compensation benefits
504
if he suffered a future on-the-job injury.” The arbitrator rejected
the district’s claim that the teacher had “drawn a line in the sand”
505
and unreasonably infringed upon its management rights.
Instead, the teacher had been forced into a “Catch-22” situation in
which “he felt forced to choose between potentially jeopardizing
506
his Workers’ Compensation benefits and losing his job.”
Thus,
the district was ordered to reinstate the teacher and to have the ISS
507
supervisor position evaluated.
In contrast, in a more recent case that also involved the Red
508
Lake School District,
Arbitrator Fogelberg found that an
industrial arts teacher whose position was cut for budgetary reasons
had “abandoned” his employment when he failed to report for his
509
new teaching assignment.
The teacher had filed for workers
compensation benefits before the school year had started and then
510
protested his fall assignment for medical reasons.
After he
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Id.
It is undisputed that such benefits are based upon those available upon
date of injury. In 1990, when the Teacher suffered his back and neck
injury, Minnesota law provided for virtually unlimited Workers
Comp[ensation] benefits. However, 1992 and 1995 legislation has
substantially reduced those benefits so that any future injury that the
Teacher might suffer would provide far less than he currently enjoys.
Thus, it was reasonable for the Teacher to insist upon a formal evaluation
of the ISS assignment before he exposed himself to its risks, real or
imagined.
Id.
505. Id. at 8.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Educ. Minn., Red Lake Local 2007 v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 38, Red Lake,
BMS Case No. 02-TD-10 (2002) (Fogelberg, Arb.).
509. Id. at 15.
510. Id. at 3.
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exhausted his sick and personal leave and still failed to return to
work, despite repeated communications urging him to do so, the
district placed the teacher on leave without pay and ultimately
511
proposed his discharge for “job abandonment.”
Arbitrator
Fogelberg ordered that termination on the grounds that the
teacher never provided the appropriate medical documentation to
512
verify that he was unable to work.
VII. PENALTY
Minnesota law denies an arbitrator the authority to order a
lesser penalty than termination or discharge except “to the extent
513
that either party proposes such lesser penalty in the proceeding.”
Thus, an arbitrator who finds that the evidence would have
supported some form of discipline—even if insufficient to support
the discharge now at issue—cannot impose a lesser penalty if the
514
parties have not granted him or her the right to do so.
For
example, in a case involving the Pillager School District, Arbitrator
Imes found that the evidence did not support discharging the
515
teacher because he abused his internet privileges.
Although she
did find that the evidence would have supported a lesser form of
discipline, Imes could not order it because the parties had not
516
given her the authority to do so.
Similarly, in a case involving the Duluth School District, the
parties did not give Arbitrator Berquist the option of imposing a
517
lesser penalty.
Thus he was forced to choose between the
district’s proposal to suspend and demote the principal—causing
her to forfeit years of seniority and $12,000 annual pay—or to
adopt the principal’s proposal of no more than a four-week
518
519
suspension.
Arbitrator Berquist selected the latter penalty.
In
520
contrast, in Daly the parties agreed beforehand to give the
511. Id. at 5-6.
512. Id. at 12-13.
513. MINN. STAT. §§ 122A.40, subd. 15(c), 122A.41, subd. 13(c) (2002).
514. See id. §§ 122A.40, subd. 15(c), 122A.41, subd. 13(c).
515. Gillson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 116, Pillager, BMS Case No. 98-TD-13
(1998) (Imes, Arb.).
516. Id. at 10.
517. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709 & Grievant, BMS Case No. 99-TD-5, 6 (1999)
(Berquist, Arb.).
518. Id. at 28-29.
519. Id. at 32.
520. Daly v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 152, Moorhead, BMS Case No. 00-TD-2
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arbitrator authority to order a lesser penalty if she concluded the
521
With this authority, the
evidence did not support discharge.
arbitrator reduced the discharge to a sixty-day unpaid suspension
and gave the district the discretion to schedule that suspension to
522
accommodate its curricular needs.
Thus, the parties have three choices concerning penalty: (1)
go for broke and force the arbitrator to an all-or-nothing decision
typically between discharge versus reinstatement and a make-whole
award; (2) modify the all-or-nothing approach by proposing an
alternative lesser penalty, thereby giving the arbitrator more
options from which to choose; or (3) agree to grant the arbitrator
authority to craft an appropriate penalty, should the evidence
support discipline short of discharge.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Minnesota education law, as set forth in the Continuing
Contract Act and the Teacher Tenure Act, has had a profound
impact on Minnesota’s educational system and will continue to do
so. When these statutes are used to govern a teacher’s discharge
“for cause,” the issues are complex and the stakes are high for
everyone involved. However, for all of the difficulties that
surround this painful process, these statutes provide sound
guidance to courts and arbitrators called upon to decide these
matters. Their thoughtful decisions have produced a body of
authority and a system that, despite criticism of individual cases,
most could agree is sound and workable.

(2000) (Ver Ploeg, Arb.).
521. See id. at 13-15.
522. Id. at 20.
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